{"title":"欧几里得严谨性与(缺失的)反射角奇案","authors":"Anand Ekbote","doi":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2024.08.002","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>I examine a known case of undergeneralization in Euclid's <span><em>Elements</em></span> arising from Euclid's non-cognizance of the reflex angle. Sir Thomas Heath (1956) attributed the undergeneralization to Euclid's lack of awareness, an assessment that I dispute. Non-recognition of reflex angles also leads to Proclus' four-sided triangles which violate an essential property of triangles. I show that these issues are resolvable. However, the question as to why Euclid did not acknowledge the reflex angle remains. I claim that the best explanation is that Euclid was guided by reasons of rigor. I argue that the propositional role of <span><em>diagrammata</em></span> in Greek mathematics as expounded by Netz (1998,2003) and Euclid's view of the reliability of sense perception impose a crucial representational constraint that governs how diagrams could be used in the <span><em>Elements.</em></span> I show that the missing reflex angle, and the careful crafting of definitions in the <span><em>Elements</em></span> are evidence that the representation constraint was indeed meticulously followed, even at apparent cost. I argue that alternative explanations for the missing reflex angle are not tenable. In sum, Euclid was aware of the limitations of diagrams, and worked assiduously within their limitations to preserve rigor.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":49467,"journal":{"name":"Studies in History and Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4000,"publicationDate":"2024-09-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Euclidean rigor and the curious case of the (missing) reflex angle\",\"authors\":\"Anand Ekbote\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.shpsa.2024.08.002\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><div>I examine a known case of undergeneralization in Euclid's <span><em>Elements</em></span> arising from Euclid's non-cognizance of the reflex angle. Sir Thomas Heath (1956) attributed the undergeneralization to Euclid's lack of awareness, an assessment that I dispute. Non-recognition of reflex angles also leads to Proclus' four-sided triangles which violate an essential property of triangles. I show that these issues are resolvable. However, the question as to why Euclid did not acknowledge the reflex angle remains. I claim that the best explanation is that Euclid was guided by reasons of rigor. I argue that the propositional role of <span><em>diagrammata</em></span> in Greek mathematics as expounded by Netz (1998,2003) and Euclid's view of the reliability of sense perception impose a crucial representational constraint that governs how diagrams could be used in the <span><em>Elements.</em></span> I show that the missing reflex angle, and the careful crafting of definitions in the <span><em>Elements</em></span> are evidence that the representation constraint was indeed meticulously followed, even at apparent cost. I argue that alternative explanations for the missing reflex angle are not tenable. In sum, Euclid was aware of the limitations of diagrams, and worked assiduously within their limitations to preserve rigor.</div></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":49467,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Studies in History and Philosophy of Science\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.4000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-09-24\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Studies in History and Philosophy of Science\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"98\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0039368124001225\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"哲学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Studies in History and Philosophy of Science","FirstCategoryId":"98","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0039368124001225","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
Euclidean rigor and the curious case of the (missing) reflex angle
I examine a known case of undergeneralization in Euclid's Elements arising from Euclid's non-cognizance of the reflex angle. Sir Thomas Heath (1956) attributed the undergeneralization to Euclid's lack of awareness, an assessment that I dispute. Non-recognition of reflex angles also leads to Proclus' four-sided triangles which violate an essential property of triangles. I show that these issues are resolvable. However, the question as to why Euclid did not acknowledge the reflex angle remains. I claim that the best explanation is that Euclid was guided by reasons of rigor. I argue that the propositional role of diagrammata in Greek mathematics as expounded by Netz (1998,2003) and Euclid's view of the reliability of sense perception impose a crucial representational constraint that governs how diagrams could be used in the Elements. I show that the missing reflex angle, and the careful crafting of definitions in the Elements are evidence that the representation constraint was indeed meticulously followed, even at apparent cost. I argue that alternative explanations for the missing reflex angle are not tenable. In sum, Euclid was aware of the limitations of diagrams, and worked assiduously within their limitations to preserve rigor.
期刊介绍:
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science is devoted to the integrated study of the history, philosophy and sociology of the sciences. The editors encourage contributions both in the long-established areas of the history of the sciences and the philosophy of the sciences and in the topical areas of historiography of the sciences, the sciences in relation to gender, culture and society and the sciences in relation to arts. The Journal is international in scope and content and publishes papers from a wide range of countries and cultural traditions.