{"title":"矿工竞争和交易费用","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106736","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In order to maintain the function of a decentralized financial system like Bitcoin, transaction fees are offered to engage miners in the transaction confirmation process. This paper investigates the effect of miner competition on the equilibrium transaction fees. We develop a game-theoretic model with costly entry into mining activities. We find that miners may strategically assemble fewer transactions into a block to reduce total fees, and as a result, to deter entry. Equilibrium transaction fees also depend on block rewards as a rise in total fees is accompanied by a drop in rewards. Our empirical analysis supports the model’s predictions. We provide evidence on the existence of excess capacity in a block, taking into account the random confirmation process. The empirical findings demonstrate that heightened competition tends to increase the block size and total fees. Furthermore, the halving of rewards correlates to a fee hike.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.3000,"publicationDate":"2024-09-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268124003500/pdfft?md5=d2c49209c7c960727db657c0fdaa2860&pid=1-s2.0-S0167268124003500-main.pdf","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Miner competition and transaction fees\",\"authors\":\"\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106736\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><div>In order to maintain the function of a decentralized financial system like Bitcoin, transaction fees are offered to engage miners in the transaction confirmation process. This paper investigates the effect of miner competition on the equilibrium transaction fees. We develop a game-theoretic model with costly entry into mining activities. We find that miners may strategically assemble fewer transactions into a block to reduce total fees, and as a result, to deter entry. Equilibrium transaction fees also depend on block rewards as a rise in total fees is accompanied by a drop in rewards. Our empirical analysis supports the model’s predictions. We provide evidence on the existence of excess capacity in a block, taking into account the random confirmation process. The empirical findings demonstrate that heightened competition tends to increase the block size and total fees. Furthermore, the halving of rewards correlates to a fee hike.</div></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":48409,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":2.3000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-09-23\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268124003500/pdfft?md5=d2c49209c7c960727db657c0fdaa2860&pid=1-s2.0-S0167268124003500-main.pdf\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268124003500\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268124003500","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
In order to maintain the function of a decentralized financial system like Bitcoin, transaction fees are offered to engage miners in the transaction confirmation process. This paper investigates the effect of miner competition on the equilibrium transaction fees. We develop a game-theoretic model with costly entry into mining activities. We find that miners may strategically assemble fewer transactions into a block to reduce total fees, and as a result, to deter entry. Equilibrium transaction fees also depend on block rewards as a rise in total fees is accompanied by a drop in rewards. Our empirical analysis supports the model’s predictions. We provide evidence on the existence of excess capacity in a block, taking into account the random confirmation process. The empirical findings demonstrate that heightened competition tends to increase the block size and total fees. Furthermore, the halving of rewards correlates to a fee hike.
期刊介绍:
The Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization is devoted to theoretical and empirical research concerning economic decision, organization and behavior and to economic change in all its aspects. Its specific purposes are to foster an improved understanding of how human cognitive, computational and informational characteristics influence the working of economic organizations and market economies and how an economy structural features lead to various types of micro and macro behavior, to changing patterns of development and to institutional evolution. Research with these purposes that explore the interrelations of economics with other disciplines such as biology, psychology, law, anthropology, sociology and mathematics is particularly welcome.