Political entrepreneurs and the perils of the top office

This case study examines whether politically connected entrepreneurs benefit from their political connections. We study the regulated Thai telecoms industry from its inception in the early 1980s. We examine the telecoms firms owned by an entrepreneur turned politician, who rose to the position of prime minister in 2001 and was deposed in 2006. We develop the concepts of the political entrepreneur and his/her political lifecycle. We show that the value of political entrepreneur's political activities and connections varies through this lifecycle. Political entrepreneurs are likely to benefit more from informal ties with politicians and less visible political involvement early in their lifecycle, while rising to higher-level political offices is less likely to benefit them. This is due to a range of internal and external limitations on the values political entrepreneurs derive from their political activities including the negative impact of greater visibility and scrutiny from media and political opposition. Also, the business model of political entrepreneurship is likely to be copied by business rivals, causing political rents to be shared or competed away. We also find that crises increase the value of political connections.