伊壁鸠鲁主义与安乐死

Jeremy W Skrzypek
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引用次数: 0

摘要

如果伊壁鸠鲁关于死亡无害的论证是成功的,那么它们也成功地破坏了医生协助自杀、安乐死和终止无望妊娠的一个常见理由,我称之为 "仁慈直觉"。因为,如果死亡对死者不是一种伤害,那么对她也不可能是一种益处,即使是在剧烈和长期痛苦的情况下。因此,在本文中,我将为 "死亡不能给受苦的人带来好处 "这一说法进行辩护。首先,我强调了这一论点的伊壁鸠鲁学派基础,重点论述了伊壁鸠鲁学派关于死亡无害的三个主要论点及其无益的类似论点。然后,我接着探讨了该论证的几个重要局限性,这些局限性为避免得出该论证的结论提供了一些策略。在此过程中,我将逐一回应这些回避策略。我的结论是,即使承认该论证的几个局限性,它仍然对 "仁慈直觉 "提出了严峻的挑战。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Epicureanism and euthanasia.

If Epicurean arguments for the harmlessness of death are successful, then they also successfully undermine a common justification for physician-assisted suicide, euthanasia, and the termination of hopeless pregnancies that I call the 'Mercy Intuition', according to which, by ending the life of a suffering loved one for whom there is little to no chance of recovery, one is relieving that person of her suffering, and thus providing a great benefit to her. For, if death is not a harm to the person who dies, then it cannot be a benefit to her either, even in cases of intense and prolonged suffering. Along these lines, in this paper, I defend the claim that death cannot provide a benefit to those who are suffering. I begin by highlighting the Epicurean foundations of the argument, focusing on three main Epicurean arguments for the harmlessness of death and their no-benefit analogues. I then move on to explore several important limitations of the argument, which make available a number of strategies for avoiding its conclusion. Along the way, I respond to each of these avoidance strategies. I conclude that even granting several of its limitations, the argument still poses a serious challenge to the Mercy Intuition.

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