Abu Amin , Sabur Mollah , Syed Kamal , Yang Zhao , Rasim Simsek
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Independent directors’ connectedness and bank risk-taking
This study examines the role of independent directors’ network centrality in bank risk-taking. Following the shareholder-incentive hypothesis and social-network theory, we predict and find that independent directors’ connectedness is positively associated with bank risk-taking. The results hold after a battery of robustness checks and endogeneity tests. Furthermore, consistent with the influence channel of networks, we show that connectedness empowers independent directors, whereas influential independent directors facilitate aggressive investment. We also find that the risk-taking effects are more pronounced for complex banks and banks with higher equity capital, higher income diversity, and lower cost-efficiency.
期刊介绍:
The Journal of Financial Stability provides an international forum for rigorous theoretical and empirical macro and micro economic and financial analysis of the causes, management, resolution and preventions of financial crises, including banking, securities market, payments and currency crises. The primary focus is on applied research that would be useful in affecting public policy with respect to financial stability. Thus, the Journal seeks to promote interaction among researchers, policy-makers and practitioners to identify potential risks to financial stability and develop means for preventing, mitigating or managing these risks both within and across countries.