外包与授权再制造,差别定价与统一定价:供应链视角

IF 8.3 1区 工程技术 Q1 ECONOMICS
Junfei Ding , Xujin Pu , Wen Zhang
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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们研究了一个三层闭环供应链,其中供应商向原始设备制造商(OEM)和第三方再制造商(TPR)销售不可再制造的关键零部件。供应商在为关键零部件定价时有两种选择:统一定价政策和差别定价政策。此外,原始设备制造商可以选择将再制造业务外包或授权给 TPR。我们利用博弈论框架,分析了两种定价政策和两种再制造模式的多重博弈均衡点。我们的研究结果表明,与授权再制造模式相比,外包再制造模式对供应商、原始设备制造商、消费者和社会来说是一个多赢的方案,但它可能会对TPR不利。与统一定价政策相比,差别定价政策可能会带来供应商、TPR 和消费者的共赢,但会损害 OEM 和社会。我们还表明,在一定条件下,价格歧视可以激励再制造并提高环境效益。对社会福利和环境影响的分析为政府考虑放宽反价格歧视法提供了及时的管理启示。为了检验结果的稳健性,我们对模型进行了扩展,纳入了关键零部件的生产成本、再制造成本和两期框架。结果表明,所有核心观点仍然有效,关键零部件的不可再制造性阻碍了再制造。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Outsourcing vs. authorization remanufacturing and differential vs. uniform pricing: A supply chain perspective

We study a three-tier closed-loop supply chain in which a supplier sells un-remanufacturable key components to an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and a third-party remanufacturer (TPR). The supplier has two options to price the key components: the uniform pricing policy and the differential pricing policy. Additionally, the OEM has the choice to either outsource or authorize the remanufacturing business to the TPR. Using a game-theoretic framework, we analyze the equilibria of multiple games that the two pricing policies and the two remanufacturing modes are available. Among other findings, we show that compared with the authorization remanufacturing mode, the outsourcing remanufacturing mode is a win–win solution for the supplier, the OEM, the consumers, and the society, but it may be detrimental to the TPR. Compared with the uniform pricing policy, the differential pricing policy may lead to win–win situation for the supplier, the TPR, and the consumers, but it hurts the OEM and the society. We also show that price discrimination can motivate remanufacturing and improve environmental benefits under certain conditions. The analysis of social welfare and environmental impacts provides timely managerial insights for governments considering relaxing anti-price discrimination laws. To check the robustness of our results, we extend our models to incorporate the production cost of key components, the remanufacturing cost, and a two-period framework. The results indicate that all core insights remain valid and the un-remanufacturability of key components hinders remanufacturing.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
16.20
自引率
16.00%
发文量
285
审稿时长
62 days
期刊介绍: Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review is a reputable journal that publishes high-quality articles covering a wide range of topics in the field of logistics and transportation research. The journal welcomes submissions on various subjects, including transport economics, transport infrastructure and investment appraisal, evaluation of public policies related to transportation, empirical and analytical studies of logistics management practices and performance, logistics and operations models, and logistics and supply chain management. Part E aims to provide informative and well-researched articles that contribute to the understanding and advancement of the field. The content of the journal is complementary to other prestigious journals in transportation research, such as Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Part B: Methodological, Part C: Emerging Technologies, Part D: Transport and Environment, and Part F: Traffic Psychology and Behaviour. Together, these journals form a comprehensive and cohesive reference for current research in transportation science.
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