Bank audit committee financial expertise and timely loan loss recognition

This study investigates the effects of audit committee financial expertise on the timeliness of banks' loan loss provisions. I employ two regulatory shocks that mandated audit committee expertise—the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act in 1991 (FDICIA) and a modified listing standard for NYSE and NASDAQ firms in 1999—as quasi‐exogenous settings to investigate the effects of audit committee financial expertise on the timeliness of loan loss provisioning. Using a difference‐in‐differences research design, I find that the timeliness of loan loss provisions increases with audit committee financial expertise both for the FDICIA treatment group, which had larger banks than the control group, and for the NYSE and NASDAQ exchange treatment group, which had smaller banks than the control group. Further, I find that the results are stronger for banks that have lower regulatory scrutiny, are audited by Big 4 auditors, and do not have staggered boards. Finally, I find that audit committee financial expertise decreases discretionary loan loss provisions and financial restatements. Overall, these findings suggest the importance of audit committee financial expertise in loan‐related matters, which is particularly relevant in the context of the recent Current Expected Credit Losses implementation.