贝叶斯让波尔兹曼大脑保持清醒

IF 1.2 3区物理与天体物理 Q3 PHYSICS, MULTIDISCIPLINARY

Foundations of Physics Pub Date : 2024-09-14 DOI:10.1007/s10701-024-00791-5

Don N. Page

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引用次数: 0

摘要

肖恩-卡罗尔（Sean Carroll）最近认为，预测观察结果由 "玻尔兹曼大脑 "主导的理论应该被否定，因为它们在认知上是不稳定的："它们不可能同时是真实的，也不可能被合理地相信"。虽然这种 "玻尔兹曼脑 "理论在认知上确实不稳定，但我们并不需要诉诸这种论证来否定它们。相反，我们可以通过传统的贝叶斯推理来排除这些理论，这就足以将 "波尔兹曼之脑 "拒之门外。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Bayes Keeps Boltzmann Brains at Bay

Sean Carroll has recently argued that theories predicting that observations are dominated by Boltzmann Brains should be rejected because they are cognitively unstable: “they cannot simultaneously be true and justifiably believed.” While such Boltzmann Brain theories are indeed cognitively unstable, one does not need to appeal to this argumentation to reject them. Instead, they may be ruled out by conventional Bayesian reasoning, which is sufficient to keep Boltzmann Brains at bay.

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来源期刊

Foundations of Physics 物理-物理：综合

CiteScore

2.70

自引率

6.70%

发文量

104

审稿时长

6-12 weeks

期刊介绍： The conceptual foundations of physics have been under constant revision from the outset, and remain so today. Discussion of foundational issues has always been a major source of progress in science, on a par with empirical knowledge and mathematics. Examples include the debates on the nature of space and time involving Newton and later Einstein; on the nature of heat and of energy; on irreversibility and probability due to Boltzmann; on the nature of matter and observation measurement during the early days of quantum theory; on the meaning of renormalisation, and many others. Today, insightful reflection on the conceptual structure utilised in our efforts to understand the physical world is of particular value, given the serious unsolved problems that are likely to demand, once again, modifications of the grammar of our scientific description of the physical world. The quantum properties of gravity, the nature of measurement in quantum mechanics, the primary source of irreversibility, the role of information in physics – all these are examples of questions about which science is still confused and whose solution may well demand more than skilled mathematics and new experiments. Foundations of Physics is a privileged forum for discussing such foundational issues, open to physicists, cosmologists, philosophers and mathematicians. It is devoted to the conceptual bases of the fundamental theories of physics and cosmology, to their logical, methodological, and philosophical premises. The journal welcomes papers on issues such as the foundations of special and general relativity, quantum theory, classical and quantum field theory, quantum gravity, unified theories, thermodynamics, statistical mechanics, cosmology, and similar.