Mohamed Badawy, Nada H. Sherief, Ayman A. Abdel-Hamid
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引用次数: 0
摘要
在当今文化中,安全漏洞的报道越来越多,网络安全在全球范围内日益受到关注。威胁建模方法(TMM)是一种积极主动的安全实践,对于准确定位风险并限制其影响至关重要。本文提出了一种基于以系统为中心、以攻击者为中心和以风险为中心的混合威胁建模框架,用于识别操作技术(OT)应用中的威胁。OT 由用于管理、保护和控制工业控制系统 (ICS) 的软件和硬件组成,其环境包括工厂、发电厂、油气精炼厂和管道。为了使基础设施风险概况的 "全貌 "可视化,并提高对整个攻击面的理解,拟议框架建立在几种威胁建模方法的基础上:PASTA 建模、STRIDE 和攻击树组件。然而,重要基础设施的连续性和稳定性仍将在很大程度上依赖于传统设备。因此,要保护工业环境和重要基础设施的可用性、安全性和安全免受网络攻击,就需要操作技术(OT)网络安全。近年来,由于黑客意识到 OT 安全性不足(尤其是过时的系统)有可能造成破坏,因此针对 OT 网络的重大网络攻击日益频繁。在案例研究系统的设计中,建议的框架在检测威胁和严重性方面取得了更好的效果,有助于提高安全性并支持对传统控制系统进行网络安全评估。
Legacy ICS Cybersecurity Assessment Using Hybrid Threat Modeling—An Oil and Gas Sector Case Study
As security breaches are increasingly widely reported in today’s culture, cybersecurity is gaining attention on a global scale. Threat modeling methods (TMM) are a proactive security practice that is essential for pinpointing risks and limiting their impact. This paper proposes a hybrid threat modeling framework based on system-centric, attacker-centric, and risk-centric approaches to identify threats in Operational Technology (OT) applications. OT is made up of software and hardware used to manage, secure, and control industrial control systems (ICS), and its environments include factories, power plants, oil and gas refineries, and pipelines. To visualize the “big picture” of its infrastructure risk profile and improve understanding of the full attack surface, the proposed framework builds on several threat modeling methodologies: PASTA modeling, STRIDE, and attack tree components. Nevertheless, the continuity and stability of vital infrastructure will continue to depend heavily on legacy equipment. Thus, protecting the availability, security, and safety of industrial environments and vital infrastructure from cyberattacks requires operational technology (OT) cybersecurity. The feasibility of the proposed approach is illustrated with a case study from a real oil and gas production plant control system where numerous significant cyberattacks in recent years have targeted OT networks more frequently as hackers realized the possibility of disruption due to insufficient OT security, particularly for outdated systems. The proposed framework achieved better results in detecting threats and severity in the design of the case study system, helping to increase security and support cybersecurity assessment of legacy control systems.
期刊介绍:
APPS is an international journal. APPS covers a wide spectrum of pure and applied mathematics in science and technology, promoting especially papers presented at Carpato-Balkan meetings. The Editorial Board of APPS takes a very active role in selecting and refereeing papers, ensuring the best quality of contemporary mathematics and its applications. APPS is abstracted in Zentralblatt für Mathematik. The APPS journal uses Double blind peer review.