欧洲一体化电力市场中频率约束储备合作的新型 TSO 结算方案

IF 3.8 3区 经济学 Q3 ENERGY & FUELS
Fernando J. Ribeiro , João A. Peças Lopes , Filipe J. Soares , André G. Madureira
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引用次数: 0

摘要

频率控制储备(FCR)合作是欧洲的一项努力,旨在将多个国家纳入一个一体化的国际电力市场平台,以采购频率控制储备。在这个市场中,平衡服务提供商(BSP)是供应方,输电系统运营商(TSO)是需求方。本文提出了一种在 TSO 之间分担成本的新型结算方案;该方案不改变现有的市场结算规则,也不改变现有的 BSP 收入结算方式。研究表明,现行的 TSO 结算方案是一种不公平的机制,在特定条件下会给某些 TSO 带来负成本,本文对此进行了广泛讨论。拟议的 TSO 结算方案克服了这些不公平现象。在建议的方案中,TSO 开始向本地 BSP 支付本地所需的已结算投标,剩余的进口则在随后的步骤中计算。这样做可以避免使用所谓的 "进口/出口成本",而这正是现行方案中不公平的根源所在。结果表明,如果在 2019 年 7 月至 2022 年 12 月期间采用建议的定价方案,所有 TSO 都会受到影响。具体而言,受负面影响最大的 TSO 的累计成本将增加 16%,受正面影响最大的 TSO 的累计成本将减少 32%。现行机制的不公平之处超过 5000 万欧元,占累计成本总额的 7.4%。虽然建议的机制是在 FCR 合作下进行测试的,但它也可应用于规则允许不同本地结算价格的其他市场。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
A novel TSO settlement scheme for the Frequency Containment Reserve Cooperation in Europe’s integrated electricity market

Frequency Containment Reserve (FCR) Cooperation is a European effort to integrate several countries in an integrated international electricity market platform for FCR procurement. In this market, Balancing Service Providers (BSPs) are on the supply side and Transmission System Operators (TSOs) on the demand side. This paper proposes a novel settlement scheme for sharing costs among TSOs; it proposes no changes to existing market clearing rules or to the existing settlement of the BSPs’ revenues. It is shown that the current TSO settlement scheme is an inequitable mechanism that originates negative costs for some TSOs in specific conditions, which are extensively discussed. The proposed TSO settlement scheme overcomes these inequities. In the proposed scheme, TSOs begin paying the local BSPs for the cleared bids needed locally, and the remaining imports are calculated in a subsequent step. Doing so avoids using the so-called “import/export costs”, which are demonstrated to be the source of the inequities in the current scheme. It is shown that if the proposed pricing scheme had been adopted from July 2019 to December 2022, all TSOs would have been affected. Specifically, the most negatively impacted TSO would have its accumulated costs increased by 16% and the most positively impacted TSO would have its accumulated cost decreased by 32%. The inequities of the current mechanism amount to more than 50 M€ or 7.4% of the total accumulated costs. Although the proposed mechanism is tested here under the FCR Cooperation, it can be applied to other markets where the rules allow different local settlement prices.

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来源期刊
Utilities Policy
Utilities Policy ENERGY & FUELS-ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES
CiteScore
6.80
自引率
10.00%
发文量
94
审稿时长
66 days
期刊介绍: Utilities Policy is deliberately international, interdisciplinary, and intersectoral. Articles address utility trends and issues in both developed and developing economies. Authors and reviewers come from various disciplines, including economics, political science, sociology, law, finance, accounting, management, and engineering. Areas of focus include the utility and network industries providing essential electricity, natural gas, water and wastewater, solid waste, communications, broadband, postal, and public transportation services. Utilities Policy invites submissions that apply various quantitative and qualitative methods. Contributions are welcome from both established and emerging scholars as well as accomplished practitioners. Interdisciplinary, comparative, and applied works are encouraged. Submissions to the journal should have a clear focus on governance, performance, and/or analysis of public utilities with an aim toward informing the policymaking process and providing recommendations as appropriate. Relevant topics and issues include but are not limited to industry structures and ownership, market design and dynamics, economic development, resource planning, system modeling, accounting and finance, infrastructure investment, supply and demand efficiency, strategic management and productivity, network operations and integration, supply chains, adaptation and flexibility, service-quality standards, benchmarking and metrics, benefit-cost analysis, behavior and incentives, pricing and demand response, economic and environmental regulation, regulatory performance and impact, restructuring and deregulation, and policy institutions.
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