{"title":"利他主义偏好下建筑和拆迁废物回收供应链成员的运营决策","authors":"Junlin Zhu, Hao Zhang, Weihong Chen, Xingwei Li","doi":"10.3390/systems12090346","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"How to efficiently and greenly dismantle abandoned buildings and reuse them is a dilemma facing the building material industry’s low-carbon objective. However, relevant studies ignore the influence mechanism of altruistic preferences of enterprises on green dismantling technology in supply chains. Driven by filling this theoretical gap, this paper firstly integrates reciprocal altruism theory and the Stackalberg game method and constructs a construction and demolition waste (CDW) recycling supply chain system consisting of a recycler and a remanufacturer, in which enterprises’ altruistic preferences are considered. The main theoretical outcomes of this paper are as follows. (1) In the case of unilateral altruism, enterprises’ altruistic preference behaviors help in increasing the green dismantling technological level and the amount of CDW recycling. Under the mutual altruism model, the influence of the recycler’s altruistic preference degree on the amount of CDW recycled hinges on the remanufacturer’s altruistic preference degree. (2) The utility of the enterprises and the green dismantling technological level are optimized under the mutual altruism model. (3) In a system of unequal power, unilateral “goodwill” by the follower will have a negative effect on their own interests; the leader plays a crucial role in facilitating equal cooperation and realizing win–win situations. This paper enriches the reciprocal altruism theory in waste management. It also helps in providing guidance for the recycler and remanufacturer in making operational decisions.","PeriodicalId":36394,"journal":{"name":"Systems","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.3000,"publicationDate":"2024-09-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Operational Decisions of Construction and Demolition Waste Recycling Supply Chain Members under Altruistic Preferences\",\"authors\":\"Junlin Zhu, Hao Zhang, Weihong Chen, Xingwei Li\",\"doi\":\"10.3390/systems12090346\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"How to efficiently and greenly dismantle abandoned buildings and reuse them is a dilemma facing the building material industry’s low-carbon objective. However, relevant studies ignore the influence mechanism of altruistic preferences of enterprises on green dismantling technology in supply chains. Driven by filling this theoretical gap, this paper firstly integrates reciprocal altruism theory and the Stackalberg game method and constructs a construction and demolition waste (CDW) recycling supply chain system consisting of a recycler and a remanufacturer, in which enterprises’ altruistic preferences are considered. The main theoretical outcomes of this paper are as follows. (1) In the case of unilateral altruism, enterprises’ altruistic preference behaviors help in increasing the green dismantling technological level and the amount of CDW recycling. Under the mutual altruism model, the influence of the recycler’s altruistic preference degree on the amount of CDW recycled hinges on the remanufacturer’s altruistic preference degree. (2) The utility of the enterprises and the green dismantling technological level are optimized under the mutual altruism model. (3) In a system of unequal power, unilateral “goodwill” by the follower will have a negative effect on their own interests; the leader plays a crucial role in facilitating equal cooperation and realizing win–win situations. This paper enriches the reciprocal altruism theory in waste management. It also helps in providing guidance for the recycler and remanufacturer in making operational decisions.\",\"PeriodicalId\":36394,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Systems\",\"volume\":\"1 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":2.3000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-09-03\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Systems\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"90\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.3390/systems12090346\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"社会学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"SOCIAL SCIENCES, INTERDISCIPLINARY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Systems","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.3390/systems12090346","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"SOCIAL SCIENCES, INTERDISCIPLINARY","Score":null,"Total":0}
Operational Decisions of Construction and Demolition Waste Recycling Supply Chain Members under Altruistic Preferences
How to efficiently and greenly dismantle abandoned buildings and reuse them is a dilemma facing the building material industry’s low-carbon objective. However, relevant studies ignore the influence mechanism of altruistic preferences of enterprises on green dismantling technology in supply chains. Driven by filling this theoretical gap, this paper firstly integrates reciprocal altruism theory and the Stackalberg game method and constructs a construction and demolition waste (CDW) recycling supply chain system consisting of a recycler and a remanufacturer, in which enterprises’ altruistic preferences are considered. The main theoretical outcomes of this paper are as follows. (1) In the case of unilateral altruism, enterprises’ altruistic preference behaviors help in increasing the green dismantling technological level and the amount of CDW recycling. Under the mutual altruism model, the influence of the recycler’s altruistic preference degree on the amount of CDW recycled hinges on the remanufacturer’s altruistic preference degree. (2) The utility of the enterprises and the green dismantling technological level are optimized under the mutual altruism model. (3) In a system of unequal power, unilateral “goodwill” by the follower will have a negative effect on their own interests; the leader plays a crucial role in facilitating equal cooperation and realizing win–win situations. This paper enriches the reciprocal altruism theory in waste management. It also helps in providing guidance for the recycler and remanufacturer in making operational decisions.