利他主义偏好下建筑和拆迁废物回收供应链成员的运营决策

IF 2.3 4区 社会学 Q1 SOCIAL SCIENCES, INTERDISCIPLINARY
Systems Pub Date : 2024-09-03 DOI:10.3390/systems12090346
Junlin Zhu, Hao Zhang, Weihong Chen, Xingwei Li
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引用次数: 0

摘要

如何高效、绿色地拆除废弃建筑并加以再利用,是建材行业低碳目标面临的困境。然而,相关研究忽视了供应链中企业利他偏好对绿色拆除技术的影响机制。为填补这一理论空白,本文首先整合了互惠利他主义理论和斯塔尔伯格博弈方法,构建了一个由回收企业和再制造企业组成的建筑拆除废弃物(CDW)回收供应链系统,并在该系统中考虑了企业的利他偏好。本文的主要理论成果如下。(1)在单边利他主义情况下,企业的利他主义偏好行为有助于提高绿色拆解技术水平和拆解废弃危险品的回收量。在相互利他主义模型下,回收企业的利他偏好程度对拆解废旧家电回收量的影响取决于再制造企业的利他偏好程度。(2)在相互利他模型下,企业效用和绿色拆解技术水平达到最优。(3)在权力不对等的体系中,追随者单方面的 "善意 "会对自身利益产生负面影响,领导者在促进平等合作、实现双赢方面起着至关重要的作用。本文丰富了废物管理中的互惠利他主义理论。它还有助于为回收商和再制造商的运营决策提供指导。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Operational Decisions of Construction and Demolition Waste Recycling Supply Chain Members under Altruistic Preferences
How to efficiently and greenly dismantle abandoned buildings and reuse them is a dilemma facing the building material industry’s low-carbon objective. However, relevant studies ignore the influence mechanism of altruistic preferences of enterprises on green dismantling technology in supply chains. Driven by filling this theoretical gap, this paper firstly integrates reciprocal altruism theory and the Stackalberg game method and constructs a construction and demolition waste (CDW) recycling supply chain system consisting of a recycler and a remanufacturer, in which enterprises’ altruistic preferences are considered. The main theoretical outcomes of this paper are as follows. (1) In the case of unilateral altruism, enterprises’ altruistic preference behaviors help in increasing the green dismantling technological level and the amount of CDW recycling. Under the mutual altruism model, the influence of the recycler’s altruistic preference degree on the amount of CDW recycled hinges on the remanufacturer’s altruistic preference degree. (2) The utility of the enterprises and the green dismantling technological level are optimized under the mutual altruism model. (3) In a system of unequal power, unilateral “goodwill” by the follower will have a negative effect on their own interests; the leader plays a crucial role in facilitating equal cooperation and realizing win–win situations. This paper enriches the reciprocal altruism theory in waste management. It also helps in providing guidance for the recycler and remanufacturer in making operational decisions.
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来源期刊
Systems
Systems Decision Sciences-Information Systems and Management
CiteScore
2.80
自引率
15.80%
发文量
204
审稿时长
11 weeks
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