城乡黑臭水体协同治理动态研究:三方随机进化博弈视角

IF 2.3 4区 社会学 Q1 SOCIAL SCIENCES, INTERDISCIPLINARY
Systems Pub Date : 2024-08-18 DOI:10.3390/systems12080307
Kangjun Peng, Changqi Dong, Jianing Mi
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引用次数: 0

摘要

黑臭水体问题是当前水生态系统面临的严峻挑战,其治理呈现出效率低、易复发、中央环保督察管理分散等特点,因而成为城乡生态治理中一个动态复杂的问题。本研究引入高斯白噪声来模拟环境的不确定性,并基于演化博弈理论和经典治理理论与理念,设计了一个包含中央政府、地方政府和社会力量的随机演化博弈模型。通过数值模拟,探索各主体受多种因素影响的战略演化轨迹。结果表明,在随机扰动的环境下,博弈主体的策略表现出明显的波动性,但积极培养主体的初始意愿有利于考察中的协同治理。此外,多主体共同构建 "信念系统"、检查干预的力度、异质资源的整合、有效的惩罚措施等都会影响博弈主体的治理,但在整个治理过程中应考虑资源配置的效率。最后提出了城乡 "牛圈 "协同治理的建议,促进生态环境的可持续发展。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Dynamic Research on the Collaborative Governance in Urban and Rural Black-Odorous Water: A Tripartite Stochastic Evolutionary Game Perspective
The issue of black-odorous water (BOW) represents a formidable challenge to the current aquatic ecosystems, and its governance exhibits characteristics of low efficiency, susceptibility to relapse, and fragmented management under the Central Environmental Protection Inspection, thereby emerging as a dynamically complex issue in the ecological governance of urban and rural settings. This study introduces Gaussian white noise to simulate environmental uncertainty and design a stochastic evolutionary game model encompassing the central government, local governments, and societal forces based on evolutionary game theory and classical governance theories and concepts. Numerical simulations are conducted to explore trajectories of the strategic evolution of various subjects influenced by numerous factors. Results indicate that under the environment of random disturbances, the strategies of the game subjects show significant fluctuations, but actively cultivating the subject’s initial willingness facilitates collaboration governance in inspection. Moreover, joint construction of a “belief system” by multi-subjects, the intensity of inspection interventions, the integration of heterogeneous resources, and effective punitive measures all influence the governance of BOW, but the efficiency of resource allocation should be considered throughout the governance process. Recommendations are made finally for collaborative governance of urban and rural BOW, promoting the sustainable development of the ecological environment.
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来源期刊
Systems
Systems Decision Sciences-Information Systems and Management
CiteScore
2.80
自引率
15.80%
发文量
204
审稿时长
11 weeks
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