{"title":"有共同供应商的均衡垂直结构","authors":"Kangsik Choi, Sangheon Han, DongJoon Lee","doi":"10.1111/manc.12498","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>We consider a vertically related market, in which each downstream firm produces a differentiated product by assembling a key input produced by a common supplier and another input produced by a dedicated upstream firm. On the one hand, vertical integration has the advantage of inducing the common supplier to set a lower input price, but the disadvantage of reducing downstream firms' competitiveness in the downstream market. On the other hand, vertical separation has the advantage of increasing downstream firms' competitiveness in the downstream market but the disadvantage of inducing the common supplier to set a higher input price. Contrary to results of previous studies, we find that the existence of a common supplier can lead to vertical integration under Cournot competition, which emerges as a unique equilibrium when a common supplier adopts input discrimination. Although vertical integration is better for the individual firms, it reduces the total welfare. Even when the common supplier uses uniform input pricing, vertical integration also emerges in equilibrium.</p>","PeriodicalId":47546,"journal":{"name":"Manchester School","volume":"93 2","pages":"103-122"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7000,"publicationDate":"2024-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Equilibrium vertical structure with a common supplier\",\"authors\":\"Kangsik Choi, Sangheon Han, DongJoon Lee\",\"doi\":\"10.1111/manc.12498\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p>We consider a vertically related market, in which each downstream firm produces a differentiated product by assembling a key input produced by a common supplier and another input produced by a dedicated upstream firm. On the one hand, vertical integration has the advantage of inducing the common supplier to set a lower input price, but the disadvantage of reducing downstream firms' competitiveness in the downstream market. On the other hand, vertical separation has the advantage of increasing downstream firms' competitiveness in the downstream market but the disadvantage of inducing the common supplier to set a higher input price. Contrary to results of previous studies, we find that the existence of a common supplier can lead to vertical integration under Cournot competition, which emerges as a unique equilibrium when a common supplier adopts input discrimination. Although vertical integration is better for the individual firms, it reduces the total welfare. Even when the common supplier uses uniform input pricing, vertical integration also emerges in equilibrium.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":47546,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Manchester School\",\"volume\":\"93 2\",\"pages\":\"103-122\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.7000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-09-02\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Manchester School\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/manc.12498\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Manchester School","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/manc.12498","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
Equilibrium vertical structure with a common supplier
We consider a vertically related market, in which each downstream firm produces a differentiated product by assembling a key input produced by a common supplier and another input produced by a dedicated upstream firm. On the one hand, vertical integration has the advantage of inducing the common supplier to set a lower input price, but the disadvantage of reducing downstream firms' competitiveness in the downstream market. On the other hand, vertical separation has the advantage of increasing downstream firms' competitiveness in the downstream market but the disadvantage of inducing the common supplier to set a higher input price. Contrary to results of previous studies, we find that the existence of a common supplier can lead to vertical integration under Cournot competition, which emerges as a unique equilibrium when a common supplier adopts input discrimination. Although vertical integration is better for the individual firms, it reduces the total welfare. Even when the common supplier uses uniform input pricing, vertical integration also emerges in equilibrium.
期刊介绍:
The Manchester School was first published more than seventy years ago and has become a distinguished, internationally recognised, general economics journal. The Manchester School publishes high-quality research covering all areas of the economics discipline, although the editors particularly encourage original contributions, or authoritative surveys, in the fields of microeconomics (including industrial organisation and game theory), macroeconomics, econometrics (both theory and applied) and labour economics.