可变议程下的居高临下一致性和配对合理性

IF 1.5 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS
Salvador Barberà, Dolors Berga, Bernardo Moreno, Antonio Nicolò
{"title":"可变议程下的居高临下一致性和配对合理性","authors":"Salvador Barberà, Dolors Berga, Bernardo Moreno, Antonio Nicolò","doi":"10.1111/iere.12728","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We compare the consequences of imposing upon collective choice functions the classical requirement of Condorcet consistency with those arising when requiring the functions to satisfy the principle of pairwise justifiability. We show that, despite the different logic underlying these two requirements, they are equivalent when applied to anonymous and neutral rules defined over a class of domains. The class contains the universal, the single‐peaked, and that of order restriction, among other preference domains.","PeriodicalId":48302,"journal":{"name":"International Economic Review","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5000,"publicationDate":"2024-08-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"CONDORCET CONSISTENCY AND PAIRWISE JUSTIFIABILITY UNDER VARIABLE AGENDAS\",\"authors\":\"Salvador Barberà, Dolors Berga, Bernardo Moreno, Antonio Nicolò\",\"doi\":\"10.1111/iere.12728\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We compare the consequences of imposing upon collective choice functions the classical requirement of Condorcet consistency with those arising when requiring the functions to satisfy the principle of pairwise justifiability. We show that, despite the different logic underlying these two requirements, they are equivalent when applied to anonymous and neutral rules defined over a class of domains. The class contains the universal, the single‐peaked, and that of order restriction, among other preference domains.\",\"PeriodicalId\":48302,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"International Economic Review\",\"volume\":\"4 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.5000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-08-16\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"International Economic Review\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12728\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"International Economic Review","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12728","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

我们比较了将康德赛特一致性的经典要求强加于集体选择函数与要求这些函数满足成对合理性原则所产生的后果。我们证明,尽管这两种要求的基本逻辑不同,但当它们适用于定义在一类领域上的匿名规则和中立规则时,它们是等价的。这一类域包括普遍域、单峰域和顺序限制域,以及其他偏好域。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
CONDORCET CONSISTENCY AND PAIRWISE JUSTIFIABILITY UNDER VARIABLE AGENDAS
We compare the consequences of imposing upon collective choice functions the classical requirement of Condorcet consistency with those arising when requiring the functions to satisfy the principle of pairwise justifiability. We show that, despite the different logic underlying these two requirements, they are equivalent when applied to anonymous and neutral rules defined over a class of domains. The class contains the universal, the single‐peaked, and that of order restriction, among other preference domains.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
CiteScore
2.60
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
期刊介绍: The International Economic Review was established in 1960 to provide a forum for modern quantitative economics. From its inception, the journal has tried to stimulate economic research around the world by publishing cutting edge papers in many areas of economics, including econometrics, economic theory, macro, and applied economics.
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信