如何解决企业串通伪造碳排放数据的问题：博弈论分析

IF 2.5 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2024-09-06 DOI:10.1002/mde.4380

Yong Sun, Xinqi Yang, Runtian Wu, Guangxiang Gong, Tianjie Lei

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引用次数: 0

摘要

碳排放数据造假对碳交易市场的诚信构成了重大挑战。要解决这一问题，需要采取涉及各利益相关方的综合策略。本文重点研究碳排放数据造假中的串通行为。本文建立了一个演化博弈模型来说明地方政府、碳排放企业和第三方碳核查机构之间的相互作用。分析了演化博弈的稳定性及其条件，揭示了监管处罚、信用损失和责任意识的影响。本研究提出了针对三方博弈的管理框架，为政策制定提供了有价值的启示。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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How to address enterprise collusion in falsifying carbon emission data: A game theory analysis

Falsification of carbon emissions data poses a significant challenge to the integrity of the carbon trading market. Addressing this issue requires a comprehensive strategy involving various stakeholders. This paper focuses on collusive behavior in carbon emissions data falsification. An evolutionary game model is established to illustrate the interactions between local governments, carbon-emitting enterprises, and third-party carbon verification agencies. The stability of the evolutionary game and its conditions are analyzed, revealing the impact of regulatory penalties, credit losses, and awareness of responsibility. This study proposes a management framework tailored for this tripartite game, providing valuable insights for policy formulation.

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来源期刊

Managerial and Decision Economics Multiple-

CiteScore

1.40

自引率

18.20%

发文量

242

期刊介绍： Managerial and Decision Economics will publish articles applying economic reasoning to managerial decision-making and management strategy.Management strategy concerns practical decisions that managers face about how to compete, how to succeed, and how to organize to achieve their goals. Economic thinking and analysis provides a critical foundation for strategic decision-making across a variety of dimensions. For example, economic insights may help in determining which activities to outsource and which to perfom internally. They can help unravel questions regarding what drives performance differences among firms and what allows these differences to persist. They can contribute to an appreciation of how industries, organizations, and capabilities evolve.