拨开迷雾公私合作监督能否促进高质量公共卫生体系的建设?

IF 2.5 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS
Neng Shen, Jing Zhang, Yang Chun Cao, Lin Zhang, Guoping Zhang
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引用次数: 0

摘要

如何激发多元主体协同合作的主动性和公私协同监管的积极性,是确保社会公共卫生体系高质量发展的重要途径。本研究构建了以医疗企业、卫生行政部门、医疗机构、社会公众为核心主体的四代理演化博弈模型。利用MATLAB 2018b进行仿真分析,揭示了公私协同监管下社会公共卫生体系多元主体的合作策略和运行机制,进一步探讨了不同情境下多元主体的演化稳定策略。结果表明:(1)系统存在三个演化稳定点,均存在于政府宽松监管状态下。(2)提高处罚限额可以有效规范医疗企业和医疗机构的行为,但长期来看不利于政府绩效效率的提高。(3)政府奖励可以激发各主体参与社会公共卫生体系的积极性,但应控制在合理的范围内。过多的经济激励容易使医疗企事业单位形成政策依赖。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Clear the fog: Can public–private collaborative supervision promote the construction of a high-quality public health system?

Approaches to stimulating the initiative of collaborative cooperation of multiple subjects and the enthusiasm of public–private collaborative supervision are important to ensure the high-quality development of the social public health system. This study constructs a four-agent evolutionary game model with a medical enterprise, health administrative department, medical institution, and the social public as the core subjects. Using MATLAB 2018b to conduct simulation analysis, the cooperation strategy and operation mechanism of multiple subjects in the social public health system under public–private collaborative supervision are revealed, and the evolutionary stability strategy of multiple subjects under different situations is further explored. The results show (1) three evolutionary stability points in the system, which all exist in a state of loose government supervision. (2) Increasing the penalty limit can effectively regulate the behavior of medical enterprises and medical institutions; however, it is not conducive to the performance efficiency of the government in the long run. (3) Government incentives can stimulate the enthusiasm of all subjects to participate in the social public health system but should be controlled within a reasonable range. Excessive financial incentives make it easy for medical enterprises and institutions to form policy dependence.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.40
自引率
18.20%
发文量
242
期刊介绍: Managerial and Decision Economics will publish articles applying economic reasoning to managerial decision-making and management strategy.Management strategy concerns practical decisions that managers face about how to compete, how to succeed, and how to organize to achieve their goals. Economic thinking and analysis provides a critical foundation for strategic decision-making across a variety of dimensions. For example, economic insights may help in determining which activities to outsource and which to perfom internally. They can help unravel questions regarding what drives performance differences among firms and what allows these differences to persist. They can contribute to an appreciation of how industries, organizations, and capabilities evolve.
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