规范、制度和不确定性的数字面纱--网络协议到底需不需要信任?

IF 3.2 2区 社会学 Q1 LAW
Eric Alston
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引用次数: 0

摘要

在复杂的大型人类群体中,社会规则减少了个体对自身选择集的不确定性,包括通过这些规则同时影响其他个体的选择集。但不确定性在事前可知和可量化的程度上各不相同。因此,不同类别的社会规则以结构上不同的方式处理个人行为的未来不确定性,制度和规范就是这种区别的典型例子。制度通过已知组织的高成本定义和执行,要求事先对行为和惩罚做出具体规定,这意味着制度必须面对 "已知未知"(风险),或者说组织成员的行为可以事先预测。与此相反,规范只有在社区内得到充分共享的情况下才能有效地塑造行为,这就意味着规范的应用是自动的,个人可以根据潜在的规范来安排自己的行为。这就使得规范既适用于事前已知的情况,也适用于事前未知的情况,相对于制度的表述对人类行为所要求的精确性而言。尽管数字治理带来了相当大的制度 "完整性 "的好处(和代价),但面对特定数字网络组织将经历的一系列复杂的外生冲击和人类行为,协议治理仍然是不完整的。这就意味着,数字机构需要通过本分析中详述的灵活机构机制,模仿一般机构的适应性。不过,从更广泛的意义上讲,规范可以在制度无法触及的情况下起到补充作用,这表明数字组织的设计者不能不同时考虑网络用户这一人类群体,他们将制定规范,而这些规范在任何组织真正面临不确定性的时期都是至关重要的。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Norms, institutions, and digital veils of uncertainty—Do network protocols need trust anyway?
In large and complex human groups, social rules reduce individuals' uncertainty about their own choice set, including through these rules' simultaneous influence on the choice set of other individuals. But uncertainty varies as to the extent to which it is knowable and quantifiable ex ante. Therefore, different classes of social rules deal with the future uncertainty of individuals' conduct in structurally distinct ways, with institutions and norms being the hallmark example of this distinction. Institutions, through their costly definition and enforcement by a known organization, require specific delineation of behavior and penalties ex ante, meaning they of necessity confront “known unknowns” (risk), or the conduct of members of an organization that can be predicted ex ante. Norms, in contrast, are only effective in shaping behavior if sufficiently shared within a community, which means their application is automatic in expectation to an individual ordering their conduct considering potential norms. This makes norms apply to ex ante known and unknown situations alike, relative to the precision that the articulation of institutions requires with respect to human behavior. Although digital governance carries the benefits (and costs) of considerable institutional “completeness,” governance by protocol is nonetheless incomplete in the face of the complex set of exogenous shocks and human actions that a given digital networked organization will experience. This means digital institutions need to mimic the adaptability of institutions more generally, through the institutional mechanisms of flexibility detailed in this analysis. More generally, though, the fact that norms can serve as a complementary gap-filler in contexts where institutions do not reach suggest that digital organization designers cannot avoid simultaneous consideration of the human community of network users that will define the norms that become crucial in periods of true uncertainty for any organization.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
7.80
自引率
10.00%
发文量
57
期刊介绍: Regulation & Governance serves as the leading platform for the study of regulation and governance by political scientists, lawyers, sociologists, historians, criminologists, psychologists, anthropologists, economists and others. Research on regulation and governance, once fragmented across various disciplines and subject areas, has emerged at the cutting edge of paradigmatic change in the social sciences. Through the peer-reviewed journal Regulation & Governance, we seek to advance discussions between various disciplines about regulation and governance, promote the development of new theoretical and empirical understanding, and serve the growing needs of practitioners for a useful academic reference.
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