女性获得的理财建议更糟糕吗？

IF 7.6 1区经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Journal of Finance Pub Date : 2024-07-05 DOI:10.1111/jofi.13366

UTPAL BHATTACHARYA, AMIT KUMAR, SUJATA VISARIA, JING ZHAO

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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们安排训练有素的男女卧底人员假扮潜在客户，走访了香港所有 65 家本地金融咨询公司。在理财规划公司，而非证券公司，女性比男性更容易接受只购买个人证券或只购买本地证券的建议。那些表现出高度自信、高风险承受能力或国内前景的女性客户尤其容易收到这种次优建议。我们的理论模型将这些模式解释为统计歧视与顾问激励相互作用的结果。基于口味的歧视不太可能解释这些结果。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

Do Women Receive Worse Financial Advice?

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Do Women Receive Worse Financial Advice?

We arranged for trained undercover men and women to pose as potential clients and visit all 65 local financial advisory firms in Hong Kong. At financial planning firms, but not at securities firms, women were more likely than men to receive advice to buy only individual or only local securities. Female clients who signaled high confidence, high risk tolerance, or a domestic outlook were especially likely to receive this suboptimal advice. Our theoretical model explains these patterns as a result of statistical discrimination interacting with advisors’ incentives. Taste-based discrimination is unlikely to explain the results.

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来源期刊

Journal of Finance Multiple-

CiteScore

12.90

自引率

2.50%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Journal of Finance is a renowned publication that disseminates cutting-edge research across all major fields of financial inquiry. Widely regarded as the most cited academic journal in finance, each issue reaches over 8,000 academics, finance professionals, libraries, government entities, and financial institutions worldwide. Published bi-monthly, the journal serves as the official publication of The American Finance Association, the premier academic organization dedicated to advancing knowledge and understanding in financial economics. Join us in exploring the forefront of financial research and scholarship.