{"title":"最佳默认选项","authors":"B. Douglas Bernheim , Jonas Mueller-Gastell","doi":"10.1016/j.jpubeco.2024.105203","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Previous studies of optimal default options demonstrate that either opt-out minimization or maximization is optimal under restrictive conditions. We obtain a general characterization of the solution by studying optimal defaults when one of the problem’s parameters approaches a limiting value. We interpret these “asymptotic optima” as approximate optima for non-limiting cases and justify this interpretation through numerical simulations. When the designer and choosers agree about the activity’s value, simple forms of <em>weighted</em> opt-out minimization are asymptotically optimal. Additional results encompass Pigouvian fees, normative ambiguity, and cases in which the designer and choosers disagree about the activity’s value.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48436,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economics","volume":"237 ","pages":"Article 105203"},"PeriodicalIF":4.8000,"publicationDate":"2024-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047272724001397/pdfft?md5=714e55d05cd01a14bff9de2e7cdadf18&pid=1-s2.0-S0047272724001397-main.pdf","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Optimal default options\",\"authors\":\"B. Douglas Bernheim , Jonas Mueller-Gastell\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.jpubeco.2024.105203\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><p>Previous studies of optimal default options demonstrate that either opt-out minimization or maximization is optimal under restrictive conditions. We obtain a general characterization of the solution by studying optimal defaults when one of the problem’s parameters approaches a limiting value. We interpret these “asymptotic optima” as approximate optima for non-limiting cases and justify this interpretation through numerical simulations. When the designer and choosers agree about the activity’s value, simple forms of <em>weighted</em> opt-out minimization are asymptotically optimal. Additional results encompass Pigouvian fees, normative ambiguity, and cases in which the designer and choosers disagree about the activity’s value.</p></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":48436,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Public Economics\",\"volume\":\"237 \",\"pages\":\"Article 105203\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":4.8000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-09-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047272724001397/pdfft?md5=714e55d05cd01a14bff9de2e7cdadf18&pid=1-s2.0-S0047272724001397-main.pdf\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Public Economics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047272724001397\",\"RegionNum\":1,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Public Economics","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047272724001397","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
Previous studies of optimal default options demonstrate that either opt-out minimization or maximization is optimal under restrictive conditions. We obtain a general characterization of the solution by studying optimal defaults when one of the problem’s parameters approaches a limiting value. We interpret these “asymptotic optima” as approximate optima for non-limiting cases and justify this interpretation through numerical simulations. When the designer and choosers agree about the activity’s value, simple forms of weighted opt-out minimization are asymptotically optimal. Additional results encompass Pigouvian fees, normative ambiguity, and cases in which the designer and choosers disagree about the activity’s value.
期刊介绍:
The Journal of Public Economics aims to promote original scientific research in the field of public economics, focusing on the utilization of contemporary economic theory and quantitative analysis methodologies. It serves as a platform for the international scholarly community to engage in discussions on public policy matters.