在无限重复的囚徒困境博弈中通过自愿报告进行内生监督:实验证据

IF 1.6 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS
Economica Pub Date : 2024-06-19 DOI:10.1111/ecca.12539
Kenju Kamei, Artem Nesterov
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引用次数: 0

摘要

众所周知,外生声誉信息可以改善合作。本研究通过实验研究了在一个无限重复的随机匹配的囚徒困境博弈中,人们如何通过报告同伴的行动选择来创造这种信息,以及内生监督是否有助于维持合作。实验结果表明,大多数受试者都会报告对手的行动选择,从而在报告不涉及成本的情况下成功合作。然而,当报告需要付出代价时,被试就会极不情愿地报告。因此,当报告的信息只私下传达给下一轮的互动伙伴时,他们无法实现强有力的合作规范。即使有公开记录,所有未来的伙伴都可以查看所报告的信息,代价高昂的报告也只是偶尔发生,但相对于只向下一轮伙伴发送信息的情况,代价高昂的报告发生的频率要高得多。有了公开记录,随着时间的推移,所报告的信息会逐渐积累并变得更加翔实,从而帮助群体形成合作规范。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。

Endogenous monitoring through voluntary reporting in an infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma game: experimental evidence

Endogenous monitoring through voluntary reporting in an infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma game: experimental evidence

Exogenous reputational information is known to improve cooperation. This study experimentally investigates how people create such information by reporting their partner's action choices, and whether endogenous monitoring helps to sustain cooperation, in an indefinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma game with random matching. The experimental results show that most subjects report their opponents' action choices, thereby successfully cooperating when reporting does not involve costs. However, when reporting is costly, participants are strongly discouraged from doing so. Consequently, they fail to achieve strong cooperative norms when the reported information is conveyed privately only to their next-round interaction partners. Costly reporting occurs only occasionally even when there is a public record whereby all future partners can check the reported information, but significantly more frequently relative to the condition in which it is sent to the next partner only. With public records, groups can foster cooperative norms aided by reported information that gradually accumulates and becomes more informative over time.

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来源期刊
Economica
Economica ECONOMICS-
CiteScore
2.40
自引率
0.00%
发文量
49
审稿时长
5 weeks
期刊介绍: Economica is an international journal devoted to research in all branches of economics. Theoretical and empirical articles are welcome from all parts of the international research community. Economica is a leading economics journal, appearing high in the published citation rankings. In addition to the main papers which make up each issue, there is an extensive review section, covering a wide range of recently published titles at all levels.
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