贿赂、工厂规模和与规模相关的扭曲

IF 5.1 1区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS
M. Nazım Tamkoç
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引用次数: 0

摘要

我的研究表明,在土耳其,小工厂的贿赂支出占其产出的比例高于大工厂,而且与行贿工厂相比,不行贿的工厂面临更高的扭曲。我建立了一个单部门增长模型,在这个模型中,规模依赖性扭曲、贿赂机会和不同规模的工厂并存。在该模型中,工厂可以通过贿赂来避免扭曲。模型参数与扭曲和贿赂机会进行了校准,以反映土耳其数据中的工厂规模分布以及不同规模工厂的贿赂支出。反事实分析表明,在存在贿赂机会的情况下,规模依赖性扭曲的扭曲程度会降低。由于工厂可以通过支付更多的贿赂来规避扭曲,因此扭曲的规模依赖性增加所产生的总体影响较小。从数量上看,当经济中存在贿赂机会时,工厂的平均规模和产出分别会增加 7.8%和 2.0%。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Bribery, plant size and size dependent distortions

I document that small plants spend a higher fraction of their output on bribery than big plants, and that non-bribe-paying plants face higher distortions compared to bribe-paying plants in Türkiye. I develop a one-sector growth model in which size-dependent distortions, bribery opportunities, and different plant sizes coexist. In the model, plants are able to avoid distortions through bribery. The model parameters are calibrated with distortions and bribery opportunities in order to account for the plant size distribution as well as bribery expenditures by different plant sizes in the Turkish data. Counterfactual exercises show that size-dependent distortions become less distortionary in the presence of bribery opportunities. An increase in the size dependency of distortions has smaller aggregate effects since plants are able to circumvent distortions by paying larger bribes. Quantitatively, when bribery opportunities are present in the economy, mean plant size and output are 7.8 and 2.0 percent higher, respectively.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
8.30
自引率
4.00%
发文量
126
审稿时长
72 days
期刊介绍: The Journal of Development Economics publishes papers relating to all aspects of economic development - from immediate policy concerns to structural problems of underdevelopment. The emphasis is on quantitative or analytical work, which is relevant as well as intellectually stimulating.
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