关联分析师在首次公开募股前的炒作:动机与后果

IF 7.2 1区 经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE
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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们首次研究了承销商关联分析师的上市前研究报告及其对股票价格的影响。通过使用中国 IPO 样本的专有数据,我们发现关联分析师对 IPO 客户的预测过于乐观。分析师的炒作抬高了发行价和售后市场价格。与情绪理论一致的是,IPO 投资者对分析师炒作的调整并不充分,因为发行价被设定得足够低于售后市场价格。当我们用一个影响分析师炒作动机的变量来衡量分析师的炒作时,结果仍然成立。我们还利用了一项监管变革作为准实验。我们的分析对有关上市前信息提供监管的争论有所贡献。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Pre-IPO hype by affiliated analysts: Motives and consequences

We provide the first study of underwriter-affiliated analysts' pre-IPO research coverage and its impact on stock prices. Using proprietary data on a sample of Chinese IPOs, we document that affiliated analysts make highly overoptimistic forecasts about IPO clients. Analyst hype inflates both the offer price and the aftermarket price. Consistent with the sentiment theory, IPO investors inadequately adjust to analyst hype because the offer price is set sufficiently lower than the aftermarket price. The results hold when we instrument analyst hype with a variable that affects their hyping incentive. We also utilize a regulatory change as a quasi-experiment. Our analysis contributes to the debate about regulations on pre-IPO information provision.

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来源期刊
Journal of Corporate Finance
Journal of Corporate Finance BUSINESS, FINANCE-
CiteScore
11.80
自引率
3.30%
发文量
0
期刊介绍: The Journal of Corporate Finance aims to publish high quality, original manuscripts that analyze issues related to corporate finance. Contributions can be of a theoretical, empirical, or clinical nature. Topical areas of interest include, but are not limited to: financial structure, payout policies, corporate restructuring, financial contracts, corporate governance arrangements, the economics of organizations, the influence of legal structures, and international financial management. Papers that apply asset pricing and microstructure analysis to corporate finance issues are also welcome.
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