偏好单一时的公平高效分配

IF 1 4区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2024-08-26 DOI:10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103048

Bas Dietzenbacher , Yuki Tamura

{"title":"偏好单一时的公平高效分配","authors":"Bas Dietzenbacher , Yuki Tamura","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103048","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>One unit of an infinitely divisible and non-disposable commodity has to be allocated among a group of agents with single-dipped preferences. We combine Pareto optimality with equal treatment of equals, the equal division lower bound, the equal division core, envy-freeness, and group envy-freeness. For each of these fairness requirements, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition for compatibility with Pareto optimality and we characterize all corresponding allocations for each preference profile.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"115 ","pages":"Article 103048"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-08-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304406824001083/pdfft?md5=7b1573863842cac7b10fbcacfdbc43be&pid=1-s2.0-S0304406824001083-main.pdf","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Fair and efficient allocations when preferences are single-dipped\",\"authors\":\"Bas Dietzenbacher , Yuki Tamura\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103048\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><p>One unit of an infinitely divisible and non-disposable commodity has to be allocated among a group of agents with single-dipped preferences. We combine Pareto optimality with equal treatment of equals, the equal division lower bound, the equal division core, envy-freeness, and group envy-freeness. For each of these fairness requirements, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition for compatibility with Pareto optimality and we characterize all corresponding allocations for each preference profile.</p></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":50145,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Mathematical Economics\",\"volume\":\"115 \",\"pages\":\"Article 103048\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-08-26\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304406824001083/pdfft?md5=7b1573863842cac7b10fbcacfdbc43be&pid=1-s2.0-S0304406824001083-main.pdf\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Mathematical Economics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304406824001083\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304406824001083","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

摘要

一个单位的可无限分割且不可丢弃的商品必须在一群具有单一偏好的代理人之间进行分配。我们将帕累托最优与平等对待、均分下限、均分核心、无嫉妒和无群体嫉妒结合起来。对于每一种公平要求，我们都提供了与帕累托最优性兼容的必要条件和充分条件，并描述了每种偏好情况下所有相应分配的特征。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

查看原文本刊更多论文

Fair and efficient allocations when preferences are single-dipped

One unit of an infinitely divisible and non-disposable commodity has to be allocated among a group of agents with single-dipped preferences. We combine Pareto optimality with equal treatment of equals, the equal division lower bound, the equal division core, envy-freeness, and group envy-freeness. For each of these fairness requirements, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition for compatibility with Pareto optimality and we characterize all corresponding allocations for each preference profile.

求助全文

通过发布文献求助，成功后即可免费获取论文全文。去求助

来源期刊

Journal of Mathematical Economics 管理科学-数学跨学科应用

CiteScore

1.70

自引率

7.70%

发文量

审稿时长

12.5 weeks

期刊介绍： The primary objective of the Journal is to provide a forum for work in economic theory which expresses economic ideas using formal mathematical reasoning. For work to add to this primary objective, it is not sufficient that the mathematical reasoning be new and correct. The work must have real economic content. The economic ideas must be interesting and important. These ideas may pertain to any field of economics or any school of economic thought.