暴力竞争与恐怖主义克制

IF 8.2 1区 社会学 Q1 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Sara M.T. Polo, Blair Welsh
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引用次数: 0

摘要

有大量文献认为,国内竞争会增加激进组织使用恐怖主义的程度和严重性,使其 "品牌 "与众不同,并 "超越 "其他组织。然而,大多数实证分析都是从一个地理区域内存在的组织数量来推断这种竞争的。这种方法忽略了特定的群体关系,如合作、言辞或暴力竞争或和平共处。我们引入了一种群体竞争的行为测量方法,并认为竞争的质量而非数量的变化会以意想不到的方式影响激进组织的暴力特征。在暴力竞争中,激进分子相互攻击,这对团体资源造成了极大的限制,增加了团体对平民支持的依赖,从而加剧了民众对暴行反弹的成本。此外,暴力竞争可有效替代通过出价排挤对手。我们认为,当竞争变得极端激烈时,恐怖组织会越来越多地选择克制策略,减少对平民软目标的高调袭击。我们利用 290 个内战组织的跨国数据(1970-2018 年)和叙利亚 "伊斯兰国 "次国家目标策略的细粒度数据(2013-2018 年),在宏观和微观层面检验了这一论点。这两项分析为我们的论点提供了有力支持。研究结果揭示了出价竞标的战略局限性,为研究和政策提供了重要启示。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Violent Competition and Terrorist Restraint

A large literature has argued that domestic competition increases a militant organization's use and severity of terrorism to differentiate their “brand” and “outbid” other organizations. However, most empirical analyses infer such competition from the quantity of groups present in a geographic area. This approach neglects specific group relationships, such as cooperation, rhetorical or violent rivalry, or peaceful coexistence. We introduce a behavioral measure of group competition and argue that variation in the quality, rather than the quantity, of competition affects the violence profile of militant groups in unexpected ways. Violent competition, where militants attack one another, imposes significant constraints on group resources and increases groups’ dependence on civilian support, which exacerbates the costs of a popular backlash against brutality. Moreover, violent competition effectively substitutes for crowding out rivals via outbidding. As competition becomes extreme, we posit that groups increasingly opt for a strategy of terrorist restraint and reduce the share of high-profile attacks on soft civilian targets. We test this argument at the macro and micro levels with cross-national data on 290 organizations in civil war (1970–2018) and granular data on the subnational targeting strategy of the Islamic State in Syria (2013–2018). Both analyses provide robust support for our argument. The findings shed light on the strategic limitations of outbidding and provide important insights for research and policy.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
14.50
自引率
1.30%
发文量
25
期刊介绍: International Organization (IO) is a prominent peer-reviewed journal that comprehensively covers the field of international affairs. Its subject areas encompass foreign policies, international relations, political economy, security policies, environmental disputes, regional integration, alliance patterns, conflict resolution, economic development, and international capital movements. Continuously ranked among the top journals in the field, IO does not publish book reviews but instead features high-quality review essays that survey new developments, synthesize important ideas, and address key issues for future scholarship.
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