{"title":"竞争动机下的信念激发:如何提问重要吗?","authors":"Lata Gangadharan, Philip J. Grossman, Nina Xue","doi":"10.1016/j.euroecorev.2024.104830","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Beliefs, alongside preferences, are an important driver of behaviour. While preferences are often inferred by the choices made, measuring beliefs is not straightforward. We design a giving experiment to compare different methods of measuring beliefs, with and without monetary incentives. Consistent with a simple theoretical framework, we find that elicited beliefs about the giving decisions of others are biased and self-serving when no incentive is offered, with non-donors reporting that giving is rare. Offering a simple incentive does not reduce the bias in beliefs; however, this bias is not observed when using an incentivised method which makes the monetary outcome associated with accurately predicting beliefs more prominent. Our findings suggest that when self-interested motivations compete with accuracy incentives, beliefs are sensitive to how they are measured.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48389,"journal":{"name":"European Economic Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.8000,"publicationDate":"2024-08-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0014292124001594/pdfft?md5=c2141434c534c4024a5dd7d3fdb77fcb&pid=1-s2.0-S0014292124001594-main.pdf","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Belief elicitation under competing motivations: Does it matter how you ask?\",\"authors\":\"Lata Gangadharan, Philip J. Grossman, Nina Xue\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.euroecorev.2024.104830\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><p>Beliefs, alongside preferences, are an important driver of behaviour. While preferences are often inferred by the choices made, measuring beliefs is not straightforward. We design a giving experiment to compare different methods of measuring beliefs, with and without monetary incentives. Consistent with a simple theoretical framework, we find that elicited beliefs about the giving decisions of others are biased and self-serving when no incentive is offered, with non-donors reporting that giving is rare. Offering a simple incentive does not reduce the bias in beliefs; however, this bias is not observed when using an incentivised method which makes the monetary outcome associated with accurately predicting beliefs more prominent. Our findings suggest that when self-interested motivations compete with accuracy incentives, beliefs are sensitive to how they are measured.</p></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":48389,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"European Economic Review\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":2.8000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-08-24\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0014292124001594/pdfft?md5=c2141434c534c4024a5dd7d3fdb77fcb&pid=1-s2.0-S0014292124001594-main.pdf\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"European Economic Review\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0014292124001594\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"European Economic Review","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0014292124001594","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
Belief elicitation under competing motivations: Does it matter how you ask?
Beliefs, alongside preferences, are an important driver of behaviour. While preferences are often inferred by the choices made, measuring beliefs is not straightforward. We design a giving experiment to compare different methods of measuring beliefs, with and without monetary incentives. Consistent with a simple theoretical framework, we find that elicited beliefs about the giving decisions of others are biased and self-serving when no incentive is offered, with non-donors reporting that giving is rare. Offering a simple incentive does not reduce the bias in beliefs; however, this bias is not observed when using an incentivised method which makes the monetary outcome associated with accurately predicting beliefs more prominent. Our findings suggest that when self-interested motivations compete with accuracy incentives, beliefs are sensitive to how they are measured.
期刊介绍:
The European Economic Review (EER) started publishing in 1969 as the first research journal specifically aiming to contribute to the development and application of economics as a science in Europe. As a broad-based professional and international journal, the EER welcomes submissions of applied and theoretical research papers in all fields of economics. The aim of the EER is to contribute to the development of the science of economics and its applications, as well as to improve communication between academic researchers, teachers and policy makers across the European continent and beyond.