Yingchen Wang, Yan Liu, Tao Wang, Xiumin Xing, Xiaoxiao Geng
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The results show that: (1) An increase in government fines can regulate the behavior of enterprises; (2) Low government subsidies are conducive to the development of a tripartite stability strategy; and (3) An increase in the cost difference between the two strategies of the enterprise will weaken its willingness to carry out green operations (and after the cost difference exceeds the threshold, the enterprise will refuse to carry out green operations); (4) The reputation value brought by the public and the additional value added by reputation under the contrast effect have an incentive effect on the enterprise and the government; and (5) The peak value of the inverted U-shaped curve of government strategy choice is affected by the degree of public participation. Therefore, the government should propose rectifications in terms of fines and subsidies, and both companies can use technological innovation to reduce costs. At the same time, it is necessary to raise stakeholders' awareness of resource utilization and encourage the public to actively participate in supervision. The research conclusions can provide a decision-making reference for improving the utilization of construction waste resources and the efficient treatment of construction waste resources.</p>","PeriodicalId":20189,"journal":{"name":"PLoS ONE","volume":"19 8","pages":"e0307652"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6000,"publicationDate":"2024-08-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC11349105/pdf/","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Evolutionary game and simulation analysis of construction waste recycling from the perspective of stakeholders.\",\"authors\":\"Yingchen Wang, Yan Liu, Tao Wang, Xiumin Xing, Xiaoxiao Geng\",\"doi\":\"10.1371/journal.pone.0307652\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p><p>In current construction waste resource management processes, the effect of government supervision is unclear, and illegal treatment and low-quality reproduction of recycling and reprocessing enterprises by construction units are common. To improve the degree of resource utilization of construction waste and deeply explore the role of its key influencing factors, a tripartite evolutionary game model of construction waste resource treatment in which the government, construction units, and recycling and reprocessing enterprises are the research objects that considers public participation factors to be established. MATLAB is used to simulate the sensitivity of relevant parameters. 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At the same time, it is necessary to raise stakeholders' awareness of resource utilization and encourage the public to actively participate in supervision. 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引用次数: 0
摘要
在当前建筑垃圾资源化管理过程中,政府监管效果不明显,建设单位违规处理、回收再处理企业低质再生产等现象普遍存在。为提高建筑垃圾资源化利用程度,深入探讨其关键影响因素的作用,建立以政府、建设单位、回收再加工企业为研究对象,考虑公众参与因素的建筑垃圾资源化处理三方演化博弈模型。利用 MATLAB 对相关参数的敏感性进行模拟。结果表明(1)政府增加罚款可以规范企业行为;(2)政府低补贴有利于三方稳定战略的发展;(3)企业两种战略之间的成本差异增大,会削弱企业开展绿色经营的意愿(成本差异超过临界值后,企业会拒绝开展绿色经营);(4)公众带来的声誉价值和对比效应下的声誉附加值对企业和政府都有激励作用;(5)政府战略选择倒 U 型曲线的峰值受公众参与程度的影响。因此,政府应在罚款、补贴等方面提出整改意见,企业都可以利用技术创新降低成本。同时,要提高利益相关者的资源利用意识,鼓励公众积极参与监督。研究结论可为提高建筑垃圾资源化利用率和建筑垃圾资源化高效处理提供决策参考。
Evolutionary game and simulation analysis of construction waste recycling from the perspective of stakeholders.
In current construction waste resource management processes, the effect of government supervision is unclear, and illegal treatment and low-quality reproduction of recycling and reprocessing enterprises by construction units are common. To improve the degree of resource utilization of construction waste and deeply explore the role of its key influencing factors, a tripartite evolutionary game model of construction waste resource treatment in which the government, construction units, and recycling and reprocessing enterprises are the research objects that considers public participation factors to be established. MATLAB is used to simulate the sensitivity of relevant parameters. The results show that: (1) An increase in government fines can regulate the behavior of enterprises; (2) Low government subsidies are conducive to the development of a tripartite stability strategy; and (3) An increase in the cost difference between the two strategies of the enterprise will weaken its willingness to carry out green operations (and after the cost difference exceeds the threshold, the enterprise will refuse to carry out green operations); (4) The reputation value brought by the public and the additional value added by reputation under the contrast effect have an incentive effect on the enterprise and the government; and (5) The peak value of the inverted U-shaped curve of government strategy choice is affected by the degree of public participation. Therefore, the government should propose rectifications in terms of fines and subsidies, and both companies can use technological innovation to reduce costs. At the same time, it is necessary to raise stakeholders' awareness of resource utilization and encourage the public to actively participate in supervision. The research conclusions can provide a decision-making reference for improving the utilization of construction waste resources and the efficient treatment of construction waste resources.
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