排放许可证下环境和社会战略的持续性

IF 13.6 2区经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS

Energy Economics Pub Date : 2024-08-17 DOI:10.1016/j.eneco.2024.107824

Gianluca Iannucci , Alessandro Tampieri

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引用次数: 0

摘要

在本文中，我们分析了寡头垄断中追求利润（PS）和对环境有社会责任感（ECSR）的企业在数量上竞争的长期行业配置。我们采用演化的方式来确定企业对章程（PS 或 ECSR）的内生选择。污染通过排放交易体系（ETS）计划进行监管，该计划将排放权分配给企业。企业也可以投资减排技术，以降低排放权的成本。我们的研究结果表明，排放交易体系的引入通过减少 PS 企业在行业中的份额，有利于 ECSR 战略的持续。与此相反，排放交易计划政策严格程度的提高会使 PS 战略更具竞争力。

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The persistence of environmental and social strategies under emission permits

In this paper, we analyse the long-run industry configuration of an oligopoly where profit-seeking (PS) and environmentally socially responsible (ECSR) firms compete in quantities. We adopt an evolutionary setting to determine the firms’ endogenous choice of statute (PS or ECSR). Pollution is regulated through an Emission Trading System (ETS) scheme that allocates emissions rights to firms. Firms may also invest in emission abatement technology to reduce the cost of emission rights. Our findings show that the introduction of an ETS favours the persistence of the ECSR strategy by reducing the share of PS firms in the industry. In contrast, an increase in the stringency of the ETS policy makes the PS strategy more competitive.

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来源期刊

Energy Economics ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

18.60

自引率

12.50%

发文量

524

期刊介绍： Energy Economics is a field journal that focuses on energy economics and energy finance. It covers various themes including the exploitation, conversion, and use of energy, markets for energy commodities and derivatives, regulation and taxation, forecasting, environment and climate, international trade, development, and monetary policy. The journal welcomes contributions that utilize diverse methods such as experiments, surveys, econometrics, decomposition, simulation models, equilibrium models, optimization models, and analytical models. It publishes a combination of papers employing different methods to explore a wide range of topics. The journal's replication policy encourages the submission of replication studies, wherein researchers reproduce and extend the key results of original studies while explaining any differences. Energy Economics is indexed and abstracted in several databases including Environmental Abstracts, Fuel and Energy Abstracts, Social Sciences Citation Index, GEOBASE, Social & Behavioral Sciences, Journal of Economic Literature, INSPEC, and more.