从量化模态前提推理。

IF 2.3 2区 心理学 Q2 PSYCHOLOGY, EXPERIMENTAL
Ana Cristina Quelhas, Célia Rasga, P. N. Johnson-Laird
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引用次数: 0

摘要

量化模态推理引起了逻辑学家、语言学家和计算机科学家的兴趣,但以前的文献中似乎还没有关于量化模态推理的心理学研究。下面是一个例子:所有这些艺术家都是商人。保罗可能是艺术家之一。然后呢?人们倾向于得出结论:保罗可能是商人(实验 1)。这似乎是可信的,而且它来自于一个直观的心智模型,在这个模型中,保罗是一群身为商人的艺术家之一。进一步斟酌可以得出另一种可能性的模型,即保罗不是艺术家之一,这就证实了结论只是一种可能性。问题在于,处理可能性的标准模态逻辑无法根据任何前提得出特定的结论:从任何前提都可以得出无限多的有效结论,但其中并不包括现在的结论。然而,进一步的实验证实了新的心智模式理论对各种推论(实验 2)、从关于可能性的前提得出的事实结论(实验 3)和从模态三段论的前提得出的推论(实验 4)的预测。因此,该理论是可信的,但我们探讨了基于模态逻辑修正的认知理论的可行性。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Reasoning From Quantified Modal Premises

Quantified modal inferences interest logicians, linguists, and computer scientists, but no previous psychological study of them appears to be in the literature. Here is an example of one:

People tend to conclude: Paulo is possibly a businessman (Experiment 1). It seems plausible, and it follows from an intuitive mental model in which Paulo is one of a set of artists who are businessmen. Further deliberation can yield a model of an alternative possibility in which Paulo is not one of the artists, which confirms that the conclusion is only a possibility. The snag is that standard modal logics, which deal with possibilities, cannot yield a particular conclusion to any premises: Infinitely many follow validly (from any premises) but they do not include the present conclusion. Yet, further experiments corroborated a new mental model theory's predictions for various inferences (Experiment 2), for the occurrence of factual conclusions drawn from premises about possibilities (Experiment 3) and for inferences from premises of modal syllogisms (Experiment 4). The theory is therefore plausible, but we explore the feasibility of a cognitive theory based on modifications to modal logic.

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来源期刊
Cognitive Science
Cognitive Science PSYCHOLOGY, EXPERIMENTAL-
CiteScore
4.10
自引率
8.00%
发文量
139
期刊介绍: Cognitive Science publishes articles in all areas of cognitive science, covering such topics as knowledge representation, inference, memory processes, learning, problem solving, planning, perception, natural language understanding, connectionism, brain theory, motor control, intentional systems, and other areas of interdisciplinary concern. Highest priority is given to research reports that are specifically written for a multidisciplinary audience. The audience is primarily researchers in cognitive science and its associated fields, including anthropologists, education researchers, psychologists, philosophers, linguists, computer scientists, neuroscientists, and roboticists.
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