帕累托最优规定是自愿提供公共产品的结果

IF 2.1 4区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Economics Letters Pub Date : 2024-08-11 DOI:10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111913

Wolfgang Buchholz , Norman Kleinberg , Barry Ma

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引用次数: 0

摘要

研究表明，在帕累托最优分配中出现的大量公共物品供给水平，也可以在非合作性供给博弈的纳什均衡中作为公共物品供给来实现。如果对代理人的偏好作一个并非十分牵强的假设，这一结果甚至对所有帕累托供给水平都成立。

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Pareto optimal provisions as outcomes of voluntary public good supply

It is shown that a large set of public good supply levels that arise in a Pareto optimal allocation can also be attained as public good provisions in the Nash equilibrium of a non-cooperative provision game. With a not very far-fetched assumption on agents’ preferences this result even holds for all Pareto supply levels.

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来源期刊

Economics Letters ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

3.20

自引率

5.00%

发文量

348

审稿时长

30 days

期刊介绍： Many economists today are concerned by the proliferation of journals and the concomitant labyrinth of research to be conquered in order to reach the specific information they require. To combat this tendency, Economics Letters has been conceived and designed outside the realm of the traditional economics journal. As a Letters Journal, it consists of concise communications (letters) that provide a means of rapid and efficient dissemination of new results, models and methods in all fields of economic research.