我会对你撒谎吗?与聊天机器人互动如何诱发不诚实行为

IF 1.6 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS
Christian Biener , Aline Waeber
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引用次数: 0

摘要

在与聊天机器人的互动中,不诚实行为是否比人类更普遍?在人工智能兴起的今天,这个问题具有重大的经济意义。我们进行了一项新颖的实验,让参与者向聊天机器人或人类同行报告与支付相关的私人随机抽签结果,并给出不同程度的代理信号。我们发现,在与人类互动时,信号代理会提高诚实度,而在与聊天机器人互动时则不会。此外,在有代理线索的情况下,参与者对人类的诚实程度一直较高。我们的结果表明,社会形象问题和感知到的诚实规范在人类互动中发挥着更重要的作用。令人惊讶的是,标准在线表格产生的诚实程度与人与人之间的聊天互动相同。在人与聊天机器人互动日益普遍的数字经济时代,这些发现为设计有效的沟通和信任建立机制提供了宝贵的启示。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Would I lie to you? How interaction with chatbots induces dishonesty

Is dishonesty more prevalent in interactions with chatbots compared to humans? Amidst the rise of artificial intelligence, this question holds significant economic implications. We conduct a novel experiment where participants report the outcome of a private, payout-relevant random draw to either a chatbot or a human counterpart, with varying degrees of signaled agency. We find that signaling agency increases honesty when interacting with humans but not with chatbots. Moreover, participants are consistently more honest with humans in the presence of agency cues. Our results suggest that social image concerns and perceived honesty norms play a more prominent role in human interactions. Surprisingly, standard online forms generate the same levels of honesty as human-to-human chat interactions. These findings offer valuable insights for designing effective communication and trust-building mechanisms in digital economies where human-chatbot interactions are increasingly prevalent.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.60
自引率
12.50%
发文量
113
审稿时长
83 days
期刊介绍: The Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly the Journal of Socio-Economics) welcomes submissions that deal with various economic topics but also involve issues that are related to other social sciences, especially psychology, or use experimental methods of inquiry. Thus, contributions in behavioral economics, experimental economics, economic psychology, and judgment and decision making are especially welcome. The journal is open to different research methodologies, as long as they are relevant to the topic and employed rigorously. Possible methodologies include, for example, experiments, surveys, empirical work, theoretical models, meta-analyses, case studies, and simulation-based analyses. Literature reviews that integrate findings from many studies are also welcome, but they should synthesize the literature in a useful manner and provide substantial contribution beyond what the reader could get by simply reading the abstracts of the cited papers. In empirical work, it is important that the results are not only statistically significant but also economically significant. A high contribution-to-length ratio is expected from published articles and therefore papers should not be unnecessarily long, and short articles are welcome. Articles should be written in a manner that is intelligible to our generalist readership. Book reviews are generally solicited but occasionally unsolicited reviews will also be published. Contact the Book Review Editor for related inquiries.
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