Social contagion under hybrid interactions

Threshold-driven models and game theory are two fundamental paradigms for describing human interactions in social systems. However, in mimicking social contagion processes, models that simultaneously incorporate these two mechanisms have been largely overlooked. Here, we study a general model that integrates hybrid interaction forms by assuming that a part of nodes in a network are driven by the threshold mechanism, while the remaining nodes exhibit imitation behavior governed by their rationality (under the game-theoretic framework). Our results reveal that the spreading dynamics are determined by the payoff of adoption. For positive payoffs, increasing the density of highly rational nodes can promote the adoption process, accompanied by a hybrid phase transition. The degree of rationality can regulate the spreading speed, with less rational imitators slowing down the spread. We further find that the results are opposite for negative payoffs of adoption. This model may provide valuable insights into understanding the complex dynamics of social contagion phenomena in real-world social networks.