印度的强制性信息披露与银行收益管理

IF 5.6 2区 经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Soumik Bhusan , Ajit Dayanandan , G. Naresh
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本研究探讨了强制性信息披露如何影响印度银行的收益管理。印度储备银行(RBI)担心不良资产(NPA)和可归属贷款损失准备金(LLP)申报不足,因此强制要求披露信息。在某种程度上,这种披露要求是印度储备银行的一种 "点名羞辱 "策略。我们的研究假设,披露信息可以减少信息不对称和道德风险--这在一定程度上反映在自由裁量的 LLP 上。研究结果大体上支持我们的假设,即通过披露信息实施监管产生了预期效果,阻碍了银行管理收益的能力。因此,强制披露对减少自由裁量的有限责任合伙有积极影响,从而最大限度地减少了银行享有的自由裁量权。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Mandatory disclosure and bank earnings management in India

The study examines how mandatory disclosures impact banks' earnings management in India. The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) enforced disclosures fearing underdeclaration of non-performing assets (NPA) and attributable loan loss provision (LLP). In a way, such disclosure requirement was a “name and shame” strategy by the RBI. Our study hypothesizes disclosures to reduce information asymmetry and moral hazard - in a way reflected in the discretionary LLP. The results broadly support our hypothesis that regulatory enforcement through disclosures had the intended effect of hamstringing the banks' ability to manage earnings. Thus, mandatory disclosures positively affect discretionary LLP reduction, consequently minimizing the latitude that banks enjoy.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
7.10
自引率
4.20%
发文量
85
审稿时长
100 days
期刊介绍: The intent of the editors is to consolidate Emerging Markets Review as the premier vehicle for publishing high impact empirical and theoretical studies in emerging markets finance. Preference will be given to comparative studies that take global and regional perspectives, detailed single country studies that address critical policy issues and have significant global and regional implications, and papers that address the interactions of national and international financial architecture. We especially welcome papers that take institutional as well as financial perspectives.
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