快讯:低绩效组织中地位价值的增加:来自电子游戏产业的证据

IF 5.2 2区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS
Balazs Szatmari, Dirk Deichmann, Jan van den Ende
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引用次数: 0

摘要

战略管理研究普遍认为,地位高的团队胜过地位低的团队。事实上,地位会使决策者倾向于高地位团队,为他们提供更好的资源。然而,我们的理论是,在以往表现优异的组织中,地位对决策者的影响要弱得多。这是因为在这些组织中,不存在预期的资源稀缺性,不会促使决策者倾向于高地位团队。因此,我们假设,在近期表现出高绩效的组织中,低地位团队和高地位团队在绩效方面的差异会更小。通过分析视频游戏行业的独特数据集,我们发现我们的理论得到了支持。我们的研究结果证实,在以往绩效较低的组织中,团队地位与绩效之间的关系更为密切。我们的研究为马太效应的组织偶然性提供了新的见解。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
EXPRESS: The increasing value of status in low-performing organizations: Evidence from the video game industry
Strategic management research generally assumes that high-status teams outperform their low-status counterparts. Indeed, status can cause decision makers to favor high-status teams, providing them with better access to resources. However, we theorize that in organizations which demonstrated high previous performance, status has a much weaker influence on decision makers. This is because in these organizations, there is no expected resource scarcity that would push decision makers to favor high-status teams. We therefore hypothesize that the difference between low- and high-status teams in terms of performance is smaller in organizations that exhibited high performance in the recent past. By analyzing a unique dataset from the video game industry, we find support for our theory. Our results confirm that the relationship between team status and performance is much stronger in organizations with low previous performance. Our study provides fresh insights about the organizational contingencies of the Matthew effect.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
9.80
自引率
8.20%
发文量
46
期刊介绍: Strategic Organization is devoted to publishing high-quality, peer-reviewed, discipline-grounded conceptual and empirical research of interest to researchers, teachers, students, and practitioners of strategic management and organization. The journal also aims to be of considerable interest to senior managers in government, industry, and particularly the growing management consulting industry. Strategic Organization provides an international, interdisciplinary forum designed to improve our understanding of the interrelated dynamics of strategic and organizational processes and outcomes.
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