{"title":"筛选、过度自信和竞争对市场效率的影响","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106690","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper examines the relationship between competition and efficiency in a labor market in which worker effort is not observed by firms, workers have private information about their productivity, and workers overestimate their productivity (overconfidence). Firms solve a contracting problem that involves trade-offs between efficiency, rent-extraction, exploitation of overconfidence, and competing with other firms for the services of workers. Regardless of the degree of competition, high-type effort is overincentivized, while low-type effort is non-monotonic in the degree of competition and may be at, above, or below the efficient level, depending on the degree of competition and distribution of types in the market. Efficiency losses are strictly positive, non-monotonic in the degree of competition, and are minimized in monopsony if low types are common enough, whereas an intermediate degree of competition minimizes efficiency losses otherwise. Worker preferences over market structures and the effects of debiasing workers on market efficiency are also discussed.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.3000,"publicationDate":"2024-08-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Screening, overconfidence, and competition’s effect on market efficiency\",\"authors\":\"\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106690\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><p>This paper examines the relationship between competition and efficiency in a labor market in which worker effort is not observed by firms, workers have private information about their productivity, and workers overestimate their productivity (overconfidence). Firms solve a contracting problem that involves trade-offs between efficiency, rent-extraction, exploitation of overconfidence, and competing with other firms for the services of workers. Regardless of the degree of competition, high-type effort is overincentivized, while low-type effort is non-monotonic in the degree of competition and may be at, above, or below the efficient level, depending on the degree of competition and distribution of types in the market. Efficiency losses are strictly positive, non-monotonic in the degree of competition, and are minimized in monopsony if low types are common enough, whereas an intermediate degree of competition minimizes efficiency losses otherwise. Worker preferences over market structures and the effects of debiasing workers on market efficiency are also discussed.</p></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":48409,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":2.3000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-08-07\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268124002968\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268124002968","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
Screening, overconfidence, and competition’s effect on market efficiency
This paper examines the relationship between competition and efficiency in a labor market in which worker effort is not observed by firms, workers have private information about their productivity, and workers overestimate their productivity (overconfidence). Firms solve a contracting problem that involves trade-offs between efficiency, rent-extraction, exploitation of overconfidence, and competing with other firms for the services of workers. Regardless of the degree of competition, high-type effort is overincentivized, while low-type effort is non-monotonic in the degree of competition and may be at, above, or below the efficient level, depending on the degree of competition and distribution of types in the market. Efficiency losses are strictly positive, non-monotonic in the degree of competition, and are minimized in monopsony if low types are common enough, whereas an intermediate degree of competition minimizes efficiency losses otherwise. Worker preferences over market structures and the effects of debiasing workers on market efficiency are also discussed.
期刊介绍:
The Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization is devoted to theoretical and empirical research concerning economic decision, organization and behavior and to economic change in all its aspects. Its specific purposes are to foster an improved understanding of how human cognitive, computational and informational characteristics influence the working of economic organizations and market economies and how an economy structural features lead to various types of micro and macro behavior, to changing patterns of development and to institutional evolution. Research with these purposes that explore the interrelations of economics with other disciplines such as biology, psychology, law, anthropology, sociology and mathematics is particularly welcome.