实验室中的公民候选人：规则、成本和立场

IF 1.6 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics Pub Date : 2024-07-30 DOI:10.1016/j.socec.2024.102276

Alexander Elbittar , Andrei Gomberg , Dario Trujano-Ochoa

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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们报告了一项研究的结果，该研究探讨了在公民可以成为复数投票制和决胜投票制候选人的情况下，候选人的参与情况。这项研究还考虑了潜在候选人的进入成本和不同平台的影响。虽然我们的研究结果与公民候选人模式的预期结果一致，但来自较不利选举地位的候选人的参与度明显过高。这些参选模式很好地适应了 QRE。这项研究补充了现有的知识体系，即在不同投票制度下候选人参选的动机是什么，并分析了处于极端位置的候选人的行为。

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Citizen candidates in the lab: Rules, costs, and positions

We report the findings from a study that explores candidate participation in a context where citizens can become candidates under both plurality and run-off voting systems. The study also considers the influence of entry costs and different platforms of potential candidates. While our findings align with the expected outcomes of the citizen-candidate model, there is a notable over-participation by candidates from less favorable electoral positions. These entry patterns adjusted well to the QRE. This research adds to the existing body of knowledge about what motivates candidates to enter races under different voting systems and analyzes the behavior of candidates in extreme positions.

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来源期刊

Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

2.60

自引率

12.50%

发文量

113

审稿时长

83 days

期刊介绍： The Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly the Journal of Socio-Economics) welcomes submissions that deal with various economic topics but also involve issues that are related to other social sciences, especially psychology, or use experimental methods of inquiry. Thus, contributions in behavioral economics, experimental economics, economic psychology, and judgment and decision making are especially welcome. The journal is open to different research methodologies, as long as they are relevant to the topic and employed rigorously. Possible methodologies include, for example, experiments, surveys, empirical work, theoretical models, meta-analyses, case studies, and simulation-based analyses. Literature reviews that integrate findings from many studies are also welcome, but they should synthesize the literature in a useful manner and provide substantial contribution beyond what the reader could get by simply reading the abstracts of the cited papers. In empirical work, it is important that the results are not only statistically significant but also economically significant. A high contribution-to-length ratio is expected from published articles and therefore papers should not be unnecessarily long, and short articles are welcome. Articles should be written in a manner that is intelligible to our generalist readership. Book reviews are generally solicited but occasionally unsolicited reviews will also be published. Contact the Book Review Editor for related inquiries.