基于区块链的环境、社会和治理信息披露激励机制:委托代理视角

IF 8.3 2区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS
Yuxiang Niu, Yelin Fu, Xinlai Liu, Arjun Rachana Harish, Ming Li, George Q. Huang
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引用次数: 0

摘要

环境、社会和治理(ESG)信息披露备受上市公司、投资者和监管机构的关注。为满足投资者和监管机构对非财务信息日益增长的需求,上市公司开始关注发布由环境、社会和治理信息组成的 ESG 报告。越来越多的上市公司被要求提供清晰、可比的高质量信息。然而,由于缺乏激励机制,上市公司很难提高环境、社会和治理信息披露的质量,而环境、社会和治理信息披露的成本又导致环境、社会和治理报告质量的不可控性,甚至可能被机会主义行为所操纵。本文从投资者和上市公司的角度出发,阐述了ESG信息披露中的道德风险问题,即上市公司提供高质量ESG报告的努力程度无法被投资者观察到。然后,我们从委托代理的角度提出了一种基于区块链的 ESG 披露激励机制,以提高 ESG 披露的信息质量,其中投资者作为委托人,上市公司作为代理人。利用区块链技术中的代币作为奖励,提高上市公司的声誉,从而增加其在区块链平台上被推介给投资者以获得优惠投资机会的机会。然后,我们根据经典的委托-代理模型设计了第一最优(FB)和第二最优(SB)合同,以克服道德风险问题。我们进行了大量模拟,以证明激励机制的有效性和可行性。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Blockchain‐based incentive mechanism for environmental, social, and governance disclosure: A principal‐agent perspective
Environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosure has drawn much attention from listed companies, investors, and regulators. In response to the increasing demand of investors and regulators for non‐financial information, listed companies have paid attention to publishing ESG reports consisting of environmental, social, and governance information. Listed companies are increasingly required to provide high‐quality information that is clear and comparable. However, the lack of incentive to listed companies makes it hard to improve the quality of ESG disclosure, and the cost of ESG disclosure leads to the uncontrollable quality of ESG reports and may even manipulation by opportunistic behaviors. In this paper, we illustrate the moral hazard problem in ESG disclosure from the perspective of investors and listed companies, in which the effort level for listed companies to provide high‐quality ESG report cannot be observed by investors. Then we propose a blockchain‐based incentive mechanism for ESG disclosure from a principal‐agent perspective to improve the information quality of ESG disclosure, where investors act as principal and listed companies act as agents. Token in blockchain technology is utilized as the rewards to improve the listed companies' reputation, thus increasing their chance of being promoted to investors for preferential investment opportunities in the blockchain platform. We then design the first‐best (FB) and second‐best (SB) optimal contracts based on classic principal‐agent model to overcome the moral hazard problem. Extensive simulations are conducted to demonstrate the effectiveness and feasibility of the incentive mechanism.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
17.20
自引率
16.30%
发文量
189
期刊介绍: Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management is a journal that publishes both theoretical and practical contributions related to the social and environmental responsibilities of businesses in the context of sustainable development. It covers a wide range of topics, including tools and practices associated with these responsibilities, case studies, and cross-country surveys of best practices. The journal aims to help organizations improve their performance and accountability in these areas. The main focus of the journal is on research and practical advice for the development and assessment of social responsibility and environmental tools. It also features practical case studies and evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of different approaches to sustainability. The journal encourages the discussion and debate of sustainability issues and closely monitors the demands of various stakeholder groups. Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management is a refereed journal, meaning that all contributions undergo a rigorous review process. It seeks high-quality contributions that appeal to a diverse audience from various disciplines.
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