政府与企业合作应对 Natech 风险的进化博弈分析

IF 2.3 4区 社会学 Q1 SOCIAL SCIENCES, INTERDISCIPLINARY
Systems Pub Date : 2024-07-30 DOI:10.3390/systems12080275
Shaojun Guo, Wei Feng, Guirong Zhang, Ying Wen
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引用次数: 0

摘要

应急管理部门与企业之间的协同互动是降低自然灾害(Natech)引发的技术事故风险的基本机制。全面的风险分析和政府与企业之间的博弈影响着这种合作方式的成效。在此前提下,我们对政企合作应对 Natech 风险进行了演化博弈分析。首先,构建了政企合作应对 Natech 风险的演化博弈模型。其次,制定了进化稳定策略(ESS)。最后,通过数值模拟证实了这些策略。研究结果表明,在较低的纳特奇风险水平下,企业会选择较低的应对能力建设投资,应急管理部门会选择延迟处置。在中度 Natech 风险下,如果应急管理部门坚持延迟策略,企业将增加投资;如果企业坚持低投资,应急管理部门将积极应对。在高 Natech 风险下,两个实体之间会出现战略错位。本研究为优化政企合作应对 Natech 风险提供了理论依据。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Evolutionary Game Analysis of Government–Enterprise Collaboration in Coping with Natech Risks
The synergistic interaction between emergency management departments and enterprises constitutes a fundamental mechanism for mitigating the risks of technological accidents caused by natural disasters (Natech). The efficacy of this collaborative approach is impacted by comprehensive risk analyses and the game between government and enterprise. Predicated on these premises, the evolutionary game analysis of government–enterprise collaboration in coping with Natech risk was carried out. Firstly, an evolutionary game model of government–enterprise collaboration in coping with Natech risk was constructed. Secondly, the evolutionary stability strategy (ESS) was developed. Finally, these strategies were substantiated through numerical simulations. The findings revealed that at lower levels of Natech risk, enterprises will choose low investment in coping capacity building, and emergency management departments will choose delayed disposal. Under moderate Natech risk, enterprises will increase their investments if emergency management departments persist with delayed strategies, and emergency management departments will react proactively if enterprises persist with low investment. Under a high Natech risk, a pattern of strategic misalignment emerges between the two entities. This study contributes a theoretical basis for the optimization of government–enterprise collaboration in coping with Natech risks.
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来源期刊
Systems
Systems Decision Sciences-Information Systems and Management
CiteScore
2.80
自引率
15.80%
发文量
204
审稿时长
11 weeks
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