{"title":"工作中的自主生产力投资","authors":"Anthony M. Marino","doi":"10.1002/mde.4334","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper considers a hidden action agency model in which an agent can be incentivized to simultaneously work and exert effort to invest in human capital or process innovation so as to increase productivity in a future period. We characterize the conditions under which the principal would and would not want to incentivize such multitasking and the conditions under which the agent would want to participate. The firm's support for investment is contingent on the agent's outside market option not being too high, and sufficient conditions for a separate contingent payment for productivity increase are presented.</p>","PeriodicalId":2,"journal":{"name":"ACS Applied Bio Materials","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.6000,"publicationDate":"2024-07-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/mde.4334","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Self-directed productivity investment on the job\",\"authors\":\"Anthony M. Marino\",\"doi\":\"10.1002/mde.4334\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p>This paper considers a hidden action agency model in which an agent can be incentivized to simultaneously work and exert effort to invest in human capital or process innovation so as to increase productivity in a future period. We characterize the conditions under which the principal would and would not want to incentivize such multitasking and the conditions under which the agent would want to participate. The firm's support for investment is contingent on the agent's outside market option not being too high, and sufficient conditions for a separate contingent payment for productivity increase are presented.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":2,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"ACS Applied Bio Materials\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":4.6000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-07-29\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/mde.4334\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"ACS Applied Bio Materials\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/mde.4334\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"MATERIALS SCIENCE, BIOMATERIALS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"ACS Applied Bio Materials","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/mde.4334","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"MATERIALS SCIENCE, BIOMATERIALS","Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper considers a hidden action agency model in which an agent can be incentivized to simultaneously work and exert effort to invest in human capital or process innovation so as to increase productivity in a future period. We characterize the conditions under which the principal would and would not want to incentivize such multitasking and the conditions under which the agent would want to participate. The firm's support for investment is contingent on the agent's outside market option not being too high, and sufficient conditions for a separate contingent payment for productivity increase are presented.
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：
京公网安备 11010802042870号
