新兴市场中银行关联董事的监督、收益管理和财务报告质量:来自印度的证据

IF 5.6 2区 经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Nemiraja Jadiyappa , L. Emily Hickman , Santosh Kumar Shrivastav , Hanish Rajpal , Navneet Kaur
{"title":"新兴市场中银行关联董事的监督、收益管理和财务报告质量:来自印度的证据","authors":"Nemiraja Jadiyappa ,&nbsp;L. Emily Hickman ,&nbsp;Santosh Kumar Shrivastav ,&nbsp;Hanish Rajpal ,&nbsp;Navneet Kaur","doi":"10.1016/j.ememar.2024.101184","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In this novel investigation of creditor governance in an emerging market, this paper examines the monitoring by Indian lenders of firms' earnings management and financial reporting quality through the appointment of a bank-affiliated director to the borrower's board. Specifically, we study the effect of having a bank-affiliated director on the board (a “BDB”), prior to the implementation of India's Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC). This setting represents a business environment characterized by underdeveloped financial institutions, a weak legal system, and inefficient bankruptcy resolutions. Unlike the U.S., where BDBs play a limited monitoring role, our evidence suggests bank-affiliated directors played an active role in firm governance and lowered earnings management as well as improving financial reporting quality in India during the period of our study. Specifically, we find lower discretionary accruals among firms with BDBs in cross-sectional, pre-post, performance matched, and propensity score matched analyses – signaling higher reporting quality and less earnings management. This finding holds after controlling for endogeneity and when measures of accounting conservatism or earnings persistence are utilized as additional measures of reporting quality. Further, the dampening effect of BDBs on discretionary accruals is more pronounced for companies subject to greater information asymmetry and those prone to agency problems. In addition, firms with BDBs on the board have less volatile ROAs and lower idiosyncratic risk, consistent with BDBs encouraging borrowers to pursue less risky investments to safeguard creditors' interests. As the first examination of the monitoring influence of BDBs on financial reporting quality – and earnings management in particular – in an emerging market, our results provide unique insights for policymakers and creditors seeking to enhance governance and reporting quality of firms in evolving business environments.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":47886,"journal":{"name":"Emerging Markets Review","volume":"62 ","pages":"Article 101184"},"PeriodicalIF":5.6000,"publicationDate":"2024-07-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1566014124000797/pdfft?md5=8c284616be70f6bfcfdd4105fc65e76a&pid=1-s2.0-S1566014124000797-main.pdf","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Bank-affiliated directors' monitoring, earnings management, and financial reporting quality in emerging markets: Evidence from India\",\"authors\":\"Nemiraja Jadiyappa ,&nbsp;L. Emily Hickman ,&nbsp;Santosh Kumar Shrivastav ,&nbsp;Hanish Rajpal ,&nbsp;Navneet Kaur\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.ememar.2024.101184\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><p>In this novel investigation of creditor governance in an emerging market, this paper examines the monitoring by Indian lenders of firms' earnings management and financial reporting quality through the appointment of a bank-affiliated director to the borrower's board. Specifically, we study the effect of having a bank-affiliated director on the board (a “BDB”), prior to the implementation of India's Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC). This setting represents a business environment characterized by underdeveloped financial institutions, a weak legal system, and inefficient bankruptcy resolutions. Unlike the U.S., where BDBs play a limited monitoring role, our evidence suggests bank-affiliated directors played an active role in firm governance and lowered earnings management as well as improving financial reporting quality in India during the period of our study. Specifically, we find lower discretionary accruals among firms with BDBs in cross-sectional, pre-post, performance matched, and propensity score matched analyses – signaling higher reporting quality and less earnings management. This finding holds after controlling for endogeneity and when measures of accounting conservatism or earnings persistence are utilized as additional measures of reporting quality. Further, the dampening effect of BDBs on discretionary accruals is more pronounced for companies subject to greater information asymmetry and those prone to agency problems. In addition, firms with BDBs on the board have less volatile ROAs and lower idiosyncratic risk, consistent with BDBs encouraging borrowers to pursue less risky investments to safeguard creditors' interests. As the first examination of the monitoring influence of BDBs on financial reporting quality – and earnings management in particular – in an emerging market, our results provide unique insights for policymakers and creditors seeking to enhance governance and reporting quality of firms in evolving business environments.</p></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":47886,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Emerging Markets Review\",\"volume\":\"62 \",\"pages\":\"Article 101184\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":5.6000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-07-24\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1566014124000797/pdfft?md5=8c284616be70f6bfcfdd4105fc65e76a&pid=1-s2.0-S1566014124000797-main.pdf\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Emerging Markets Review\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1566014124000797\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"BUSINESS, FINANCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Emerging Markets Review","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1566014124000797","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

本文对新兴市场的债权人治理进行了新颖的调查,研究了印度贷款人通过在借款人董事会中任命一名银行关联董事来监督公司的收益管理和财务报告质量的情况。具体而言,我们研究了在印度《破产与破产法》(IBC)实施之前,董事会中银行关联董事("BDB")的影响。这一环境代表了一个以金融机构不发达、法律体系薄弱和破产解决效率低下为特征的商业环境。在美国,银行董事的监督作用有限,与此不同的是,我们的证据表明,在我们的研究期间,银行关联董事在公司治理、降低收益管理以及提高印度财务报告质量方面发挥了积极作用。具体而言,我们在横截面分析、事前事中分析、绩效匹配分析和倾向得分匹配分析中发现,有银行关联董事的公司可自由支配的应计项目较少,这表明报告质量较高,收益管理较少。在控制了内生性以及使用会计保守主义或盈利持续性作为报告质量的额外衡量标准后,这一结论仍然成立。此外,对于信息不对称程度较高的公司和容易出现代理问题的公司来说,BDB 对全权应计制的抑制作用更为明显。此外,董事会中有董事会成员的公司的投资回报率波动较小,特异性风险较低,这与董事会鼓励借款人进行风险较低的投资以维护债权人利益是一致的。作为首次对新兴市场中董事会对财务报告质量--尤其是收益管理--的监督影响的研究,我们的研究结果为决策者和债权人在不断变化的商业环境中寻求提高公司治理和报告质量提供了独特的见解。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Bank-affiliated directors' monitoring, earnings management, and financial reporting quality in emerging markets: Evidence from India

In this novel investigation of creditor governance in an emerging market, this paper examines the monitoring by Indian lenders of firms' earnings management and financial reporting quality through the appointment of a bank-affiliated director to the borrower's board. Specifically, we study the effect of having a bank-affiliated director on the board (a “BDB”), prior to the implementation of India's Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC). This setting represents a business environment characterized by underdeveloped financial institutions, a weak legal system, and inefficient bankruptcy resolutions. Unlike the U.S., where BDBs play a limited monitoring role, our evidence suggests bank-affiliated directors played an active role in firm governance and lowered earnings management as well as improving financial reporting quality in India during the period of our study. Specifically, we find lower discretionary accruals among firms with BDBs in cross-sectional, pre-post, performance matched, and propensity score matched analyses – signaling higher reporting quality and less earnings management. This finding holds after controlling for endogeneity and when measures of accounting conservatism or earnings persistence are utilized as additional measures of reporting quality. Further, the dampening effect of BDBs on discretionary accruals is more pronounced for companies subject to greater information asymmetry and those prone to agency problems. In addition, firms with BDBs on the board have less volatile ROAs and lower idiosyncratic risk, consistent with BDBs encouraging borrowers to pursue less risky investments to safeguard creditors' interests. As the first examination of the monitoring influence of BDBs on financial reporting quality – and earnings management in particular – in an emerging market, our results provide unique insights for policymakers and creditors seeking to enhance governance and reporting quality of firms in evolving business environments.

求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
CiteScore
7.10
自引率
4.20%
发文量
85
审稿时长
100 days
期刊介绍: The intent of the editors is to consolidate Emerging Markets Review as the premier vehicle for publishing high impact empirical and theoretical studies in emerging markets finance. Preference will be given to comparative studies that take global and regional perspectives, detailed single country studies that address critical policy issues and have significant global and regional implications, and papers that address the interactions of national and international financial architecture. We especially welcome papers that take institutional as well as financial perspectives.
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信