宁静生活和保税公司的收购保护效果

IF 3.9 2区经济学 Q1 Economics, Econometrics and Finance

Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis Pub Date : 2024-01-02 DOI:10.1017/s0022109023001473

Eliezer M. Fich, Jarrad Harford, Adam S. Yore

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引用次数: 0

摘要

反收购措施备受争议，因为其对股东的净影响证据不一。我们认为，对许多公司来说，潜在的结合利益大于平静生活的代理成本，这就是结果好坏参半的原因。我们将企业合并和毒丸法作为收购脆弱性的外生冲击进行研究，并将股东对内部松弛的估值作为收购保护净效应的指标。易受静默期代理问题影响的公司表现出内部松弛的市场评估价值下降。与此相反，如果公司与主要交易对手之间的承诺有收购保护债券，则现金会升值。

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The Effect of Takeover Protection in Quiet Life and Bonding Firms

Antitakeover measures are controversial because the evidence of their net effect on shareholders is mixed. We propose that, for many firms, the potential bonding benefits outweigh the agency costs of the quiet life, explaining the mixed results. We study business combination and poison pill laws as exogenous shocks to takeover vulnerability and use shareholder valuation of internal slack as an indicator of the net effect of takeover protection. Firms susceptible to quiet life agency problems exhibit a decrease in the market-assessed value of internal slack. Conversely, cash appreciates at companies where takeover protection bonds commitments with major counterparties.

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来源期刊

Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis Multiple-

CiteScore

6.60

自引率

5.10%

发文量

131

期刊介绍： The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis (JFQA) publishes theoretical and empirical research in financial economics. Topics include corporate finance, investments, capital and security markets, and quantitative methods of particular relevance to financial researchers. With a circulation of 3000 libraries, firms, and individuals in 70 nations, the JFQA serves an international community of sophisticated finance scholars—academics and practitioners alike. The JFQA prints less than 10% of the more than 600 unsolicited manuscripts submitted annually. An intensive blind review process and exacting editorial standards contribute to the JFQA’s reputation as a top finance journal.