{"title":"真相偏见的致命弱点?高度的个人利害关系降低了对虚假信息的脆弱性","authors":"Myrto Pantazi, Olivier Klein, Mikhail Kissine","doi":"10.1002/ejsp.3086","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>While, by default, people tend to believe communicated content, it is also possible that they become more vigilant when personal stakes increase. A lab (<i>N =</i> 72) and an online (<i>N =</i> 284) experiment show that people make judgements affected by explicitly tagged false information and that they misremember such information as true – a phenomenon dubbed the ‘truth bias’. However, both experiments show that this bias is significantly reduced when personal stakes – instantiated here as a financial incentive – become high. Experiment 2 also shows that personal stakes mitigate the truth bias when they are high at the moment of false information processing, but they cannot reduce belief in false information a posteriori, that is once participants have already processed false information. Experiment 2 also suggests that high stakes reduce belief in false information whether participants’ focus is directed towards making accurate judgements or correctly remembering information truthfulness. We discuss the implications of our findings for models of information validation and interventions against real-world misinformation.</p>","PeriodicalId":48377,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Social Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.8000,"publicationDate":"2024-07-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/ejsp.3086","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Achilles’ heel of the truth bias? High personal stakes reduce vulnerability to false information\",\"authors\":\"Myrto Pantazi, Olivier Klein, Mikhail Kissine\",\"doi\":\"10.1002/ejsp.3086\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p>While, by default, people tend to believe communicated content, it is also possible that they become more vigilant when personal stakes increase. A lab (<i>N =</i> 72) and an online (<i>N =</i> 284) experiment show that people make judgements affected by explicitly tagged false information and that they misremember such information as true – a phenomenon dubbed the ‘truth bias’. However, both experiments show that this bias is significantly reduced when personal stakes – instantiated here as a financial incentive – become high. Experiment 2 also shows that personal stakes mitigate the truth bias when they are high at the moment of false information processing, but they cannot reduce belief in false information a posteriori, that is once participants have already processed false information. Experiment 2 also suggests that high stakes reduce belief in false information whether participants’ focus is directed towards making accurate judgements or correctly remembering information truthfulness. We discuss the implications of our findings for models of information validation and interventions against real-world misinformation.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":48377,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"European Journal of Social Psychology\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":2.8000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-07-27\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/ejsp.3086\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"European Journal of Social Psychology\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"102\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/ejsp.3086\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"心理学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"PSYCHOLOGY, SOCIAL\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"European Journal of Social Psychology","FirstCategoryId":"102","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/ejsp.3086","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"PSYCHOLOGY, SOCIAL","Score":null,"Total":0}
The Achilles’ heel of the truth bias? High personal stakes reduce vulnerability to false information
While, by default, people tend to believe communicated content, it is also possible that they become more vigilant when personal stakes increase. A lab (N = 72) and an online (N = 284) experiment show that people make judgements affected by explicitly tagged false information and that they misremember such information as true – a phenomenon dubbed the ‘truth bias’. However, both experiments show that this bias is significantly reduced when personal stakes – instantiated here as a financial incentive – become high. Experiment 2 also shows that personal stakes mitigate the truth bias when they are high at the moment of false information processing, but they cannot reduce belief in false information a posteriori, that is once participants have already processed false information. Experiment 2 also suggests that high stakes reduce belief in false information whether participants’ focus is directed towards making accurate judgements or correctly remembering information truthfulness. We discuss the implications of our findings for models of information validation and interventions against real-world misinformation.
期刊介绍:
Topics covered include, among others, intergroup relations, group processes, social cognition, attitudes, social influence and persuasion, self and identity, verbal and nonverbal communication, language and thought, affect and emotion, embodied and situated cognition and individual differences of social-psychological relevance. Together with original research articles, the European Journal of Social Psychology"s innovative and inclusive style is reflected in the variety of articles published: Research Article: Original articles that provide a significant contribution to the understanding of social phenomena, up to a maximum of 12,000 words in length.