英国核武器与禁试:约翰-沃克(John Walker)所著的《1974-1982 年国防与军备控制的平衡》(评论

IF 0.8 3区 哲学 Q2 HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
Christoph Laucht
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Despite nuclear testing in 1978 and 1979 that had confirmed the viability of a new warhead design for the Trident SLBM system even prior to the Thatcher government’s decision in 1980 to procure that system, the British government worried that a CTBT would cease all further British nuclear warhead development. By 1982, these concerns were temporarily allayed when the Reagan administration abandoned the talks. It took then a mere decade before the Clinton administration expressed renewed interest in a CTBT and an agreement was reached in November 1996 (postscript).</p> <p>In writing <em>British Nuclear Weapons and the Test Ban</em>, Walker benefited from his past experience as member (1985–2020) and director (2014–20) of the United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth’s Office Arms Control and Disarmament Research Unit, as well as his expertise as a historian of nuclear arms control. 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引用次数: 0

摘要

评论者 英国核武器与禁试:英国核武器与禁试:1974-1982 年的防卫与军备控制》,约翰-沃克著 Christoph Laucht (bio) 英国核武器与禁试:1974-1982 年的防卫与军备控制》,约翰-沃克著:英国核武器与禁试:1974-1982 年的防卫与军备控制》(Squaring the Circle of Defence and Arms Control, 1974-82 作者:John Walker)。阿宾顿:Routledge, 2023。Pp.174.约翰-沃克的最新著作是对核武器技术、军备控制和核(非)扩散问题之间复杂关系的重要研究。该书研究了 1974 年至 1982 年苏联、英国和美国就《全面禁止核试验条约》(CTBT)进行谈判时英国的意图、动机、目的和目标。Lorna Arnold、Richard Moore、Toshihiro Higuchi 以及 Walker 本人在其早期著作中主要关注的是 20 世纪 50 年代的禁试辩论,直至 1963 年《部分禁试条约》的签订,而《英国核武器与禁试》则揭示了迄今为止被忽视的核军备控制的一个方面,或 Walker 所称的 "20 世纪 50 年代以来军备控制的圣杯"(第 1 页)。作者特别关注了《全面禁试条约》对英国核武库的可靠性和安全性可能产生的影响。除引言(第 1 章)和结论(第 6 章)外,《英国核武器与禁试条约》还包括四个主要章节。出于启发目的,正文开篇概述了 1977 年至 1982 年期间在日内瓦举行的《全面禁止核试验条约》谈判(第 2 章)。在谈判期间,卡拉汉政府和撒切尔政府面临着一个根本性的两难境地:一方面,他们渴望《全面禁试条约》成为一项削减核武库的国际措施。另一方面,他们又担心禁试可能会阻碍新弹头的设计,并危及英国现有核武库的可靠性和安全性。沃克提醒我们,这种窘境类似于麦克米伦政府在 1954 [第 1061 页] 至 1958 年间遇到的情况,当时英国试图在暂停试验生效之前完成其热核武器计划。与此同时,通过国家地震台站核查《全面禁核试条约》的实际问题也增加了谈判的复杂性。接下来的三章将更具体地关注谈判中涉及英国利益的关键主题。从 1974 年开始,英国显然需要继续在美国内华达试验场进行核试验,以便为 "北极星 "潜射弹道导弹(SLBMs;第 3 章)的 "车瓦琳 "升级版研制加固弹头。与此同时,还需要进行测试,以确保英国库存导弹的安全性和可靠性(第 4 章)。正如沃克所言,英国对美国的依赖--无论是在技术上还是在试验场地方面--都让英国政府头疼不已。卡特政府与卡拉汉政府在《全面禁止核试验条约》期限问题上出现的分歧进一步加剧了这一问题。除了这些问题,英国政府还担心《全面禁核试条约》可能会对战略系统核弹头--"切瓦林 "及其替代品 "三叉戟 "潜射弹道导弹--以及战术核武器,尤其是 WE 177 自由落体核弹(第 5 章)的发展产生潜在影响。尽管在撒切尔政府于 1980 年决定采购三叉戟潜射弹道导弹系统之前,1978 年和 1979 年的核试验已证实了该系统新弹头设计的可行性,但英国政府仍担心《全面禁止核试验条约》会阻止英国进一步发展核弹头。到 1982 年,由于里根政府放弃了谈判,这些担忧暂时得到了缓解。此后仅仅过了十年,克林顿政府就重新表示了对《全面禁核试条约》的兴趣,并于 1996 年 11 月达成了协议(后记)。在撰写《英国核武器与禁试》一书时,沃克得益于他过去担任英国外交和联邦事务部军备控制与裁军研究室成员(1985-2020 年)和主任(2014-20 年)的经历,以及他作为核军备控制历史学家的专业知识。这一点在他对大量主要是英国政府文件的细致分析中体现得淋漓尽致。书中包含了一份英国进行的所有核试验的清单...
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
British Nuclear Weapons and the Test Ban: Squaring the Circle of Defence and Arms Control, 1974–82 by John Walker (review)

Reviewed by:

  • British Nuclear Weapons and the Test Ban: Squaring the Circle of Defence and Arms Control, 1974–82 by John Walker
  • Christoph Laucht (bio)
British Nuclear Weapons and the Test Ban: Squaring the Circle of Defence and Arms Control, 1974–82
By John Walker. Abingdon: Routledge, 2023. Pp. 174.

John Walker’s latest book marks an important study of the complex relationship between nuclear weapons technology, arms control, and questions of nuclear (non)proliferation. It examines British intentions, motivations, aims, and objectives in the negotiations between the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States over a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) from 1974 to 1982. While Lorna Arnold, Richard Moore, Toshihiro Higuchi, and Walker himself in his earlier work have largely focused on the test ban debate of the 1950s leading up to the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty, British Nuclear Weapons and the Test Ban sheds light on a thus far neglected aspect of nuclear arms control, or what Walker also refers to as “the Holy Grail of arms control since the 1950s” (p. 1). The author pays particular attention to the likely impacts of a CTBT on the reliability and safety of the United Kingdom’s nuclear arsenal.

Apart from an introduction (ch. 1) and conclusion (ch. 6), British Nuclear Weapons and the Test Ban contains four main chapters. For heuristic purposes, the main body opens with an overview of the CTBT negotiations that took place in Geneva between 1977 and 1982 (ch. 2). During the talks, the Callaghan and Thatcher governments faced a fundamental dilemma: on the one hand, they aspired to a CTBT as an international measure to reduce nuclear stockpiles. On the other, they worried that a test ban might obstruct designing new warheads and jeopardize the reliability and safety of the existing British stockpile. Walker reminds us that this quandary resembled the situation that the Macmillan government encountered between 1954 [End Page 1061] and 1958 when the United Kingdom sought to complete its thermonuclear weapons program ahead of a moratorium on testing coming into effect. At the same time, practical issues around verification of a CTBT through National Seismic Stations added complexity to the negotiations.

The three chapters that follow focus more specifically on key themes concerning British interests in the talks. From 1974, it became apparent that the United Kingdom required continued nuclear testing on the Nevada Test Site in the United States to proceed with the development of hardened warheads for the Chevaline upgrade of the Polaris submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs; ch. 3). Simultaneously, testing was needed to ensure the safety and reliability of the United Kingdom’s stockpile (ch. 4). As Walker shows, British dependence on the United States—both technologically and in terms of a test site—caused the British government headaches. An emerging rift over the duration of a CTBT between the Carter administration and Callaghan government accentuated this further.

Alongside these issues, the British government worried over the potential impacts that a CTBT might have on the development of nuclear warheads for strategic systems—Chevaline and its replacement, Trident SLBMs—and tactical nuclear weapons, especially the WE 177 free-fall nuclear bomb (ch. 5). Despite nuclear testing in 1978 and 1979 that had confirmed the viability of a new warhead design for the Trident SLBM system even prior to the Thatcher government’s decision in 1980 to procure that system, the British government worried that a CTBT would cease all further British nuclear warhead development. By 1982, these concerns were temporarily allayed when the Reagan administration abandoned the talks. It took then a mere decade before the Clinton administration expressed renewed interest in a CTBT and an agreement was reached in November 1996 (postscript).

In writing British Nuclear Weapons and the Test Ban, Walker benefited from his past experience as member (1985–2020) and director (2014–20) of the United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth’s Office Arms Control and Disarmament Research Unit, as well as his expertise as a historian of nuclear arms control. This shines through in his meticulous analysis of a vast volume of predominantly British government documents. The inclusion of a list of all British nuclear tests that were conducted...

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来源期刊
Technology and Culture
Technology and Culture 社会科学-科学史与科学哲学
CiteScore
0.60
自引率
14.30%
发文量
225
审稿时长
>12 weeks
期刊介绍: Technology and Culture, the preeminent journal of the history of technology, draws on scholarship in diverse disciplines to publish insightful pieces intended for general readers as well as specialists. Subscribers include scientists, engineers, anthropologists, sociologists, economists, museum curators, archivists, scholars, librarians, educators, historians, and many others. In addition to scholarly essays, each issue features 30-40 book reviews and reviews of new museum exhibitions. To illuminate important debates and draw attention to specific topics, the journal occasionally publishes thematic issues. Technology and Culture is the official journal of the Society for the History of Technology (SHOT).
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