不平等的和平

IF 1.5 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

International Economic Review Pub Date : 2024-07-19 DOI:10.1111/iere.12725

Ali Kamranzadeh, Charles Z. Zheng

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引用次数: 0

摘要

调解人建议两个参赛者达成和解，以避免冲突，在这种情况下，每个参赛者承担的成本与参赛者私下已知的实力成反比。他们的实力水平分布相同，他们的福利在调解人的目标中权重相等。然而，最优方案对其中一位参赛者的优惠远大于对另一位参赛者的优惠，因此前者总是接受最优方案，而后者只是偶尔接受。这种不平等待遇改善了和平的前景，因为它使一个竞争者愿意和解，而不必担心这一行动表明他的弱点，一旦发生冲突，他的对手可以利用这一弱点。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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UNEQUAL PEACE

A mediator proposes a settlement between two contestants to avoid a conflict where the cost each contestant bears is inversely related to the contestant's privately known strength. Their strength levels are identically distributed, and their welfares weigh equally in the mediator's objective. However, the optimal proposal offers one contestant much more than it does the other so that the former accepts it always, whereas the latter only occasionally. This unequal treatment improves the prospect of peace by making one contestant willing to settle without fearing that the action signals his weakness that his opponent can exploit should conflict occur.

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来源期刊

International Economic Review ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

2.60

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： The International Economic Review was established in 1960 to provide a forum for modern quantitative economics. From its inception, the journal has tried to stimulate economic research around the world by publishing cutting edge papers in many areas of economics, including econometrics, economic theory, macro, and applied economics.