婴儿产业死亡率的生态学研究:合法性与非法性的作用

IF 9.3 1区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS
S. X. Li, Xiaotao Yao, Jie Yang
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引用次数: 0

摘要

人口生态学家避开了新生产业。此外,之前的研究还忽略了合法性这一层面的问题以及非法性在企业失败中的作用。我们认为,在新生产业中,合法性和非法性都是企业失败的有力前因。我们将行业层面的合法性与企业层面的合法性分开,并提出了一个新颖的 "单阶段模型"。该模型表明,新生行业的在职者会同时采取行动,向行业观众宣传其典型和非典型的企业特征。这些行动不仅提升了新生行业的行业层面合法性和在位者的企业层面合法性,而且同时也煽动了在位者之间的竞争。我们利用人工收集的有关中国共享单车企业的新闻报道数据库,考察了2014年至2017年这一新生行业的企业倒闭情况。我们发现,在行业层面,行业层面的合法性降低了企业的死亡率,而行业层面的非法性则提高了企业的死亡率。在企业层面,我们证实了企业间竞争的不利和有利影响。当焦点企业的竞争对手大肆宣扬其非典型企业特征时,焦点企业失败的可能性就会增加;当竞争对手和焦点企业都试图突出其典型企业特征时,焦点企业的失败率就会降低。就公司层面的非法性而言,焦点公司及其竞争对手的非法性都会增加公司的死亡率。我们证实,合法性和非法性并不是一个连续统一体的两极。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Ecological Examination of Mortality Rate in an Infant Industry: The Roles of Legitimacy and Illegitimacy
Population ecologists have sidestepped infant industries. Moreover, prior examinations have overlooked the level issue of legitimacy and the role of illegitimacy in firm failure. We suggest that both legitimacy and illegitimacy are potent antecedents of firm failures in an infant industry. We separate industry-level legitimacy from firm-level legitimacy and propose a novel “one-stage model.” This model indicates that incumbents of the infant industry concurrently take actions to advertise their typical and atypical firm features to industry spectators. These actions not only elevate both the industry-level legitimacy of the infant industry and the firm-level legitimacy of the incumbents but also simultaneously incite competition among the incumbents. We used a manually collected database of news articles on Chinese bicycle-sharing companies to examine firm failures in this infant industry from 2014 to 2017. We found that at the industry level, while industry-level legitimacy reduces a firm’s mortality, industry-level illegitimacy elevates the firm’s mortality. At the firm level, we confirm both the detrimental and beneficial effects of interfirm competition. When the rivals of the focal firm tout their atypical firm features, the focal firm’s likelihood of failure increases; when rivals and focal firm try to highlight their typical firm features, the focal firm’s failure rate decreases. When it comes to firm-level illegitimacy, both the focal firm and its rivals’ illegitimacies increase a firm’s mortality. We confirm that legitimacy and illegitimacy are not two poles of a single continuum.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
22.40
自引率
5.20%
发文量
0
期刊介绍: The Journal of Management (JOM) aims to publish rigorous empirical and theoretical research articles that significantly contribute to the field of management. It is particularly interested in papers that have a strong impact on the overall management discipline. JOM also encourages the submission of novel ideas and fresh perspectives on existing research. The journal covers a wide range of areas, including business strategy and policy, organizational behavior, human resource management, organizational theory, entrepreneurship, and research methods. It provides a platform for scholars to present their work on these topics and fosters intellectual discussion and exchange in these areas.
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