促进还是防止制造商蚕食?需求信息不对称下销售形式的战略作用

IF 5.9 3区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS
Lu-Yu Chang , Chuan-Xu Wang , Qing Zhang
{"title":"促进还是防止制造商蚕食?需求信息不对称下销售形式的战略作用","authors":"Lu-Yu Chang ,&nbsp;Chuan-Xu Wang ,&nbsp;Qing Zhang","doi":"10.1016/j.elerap.2024.101435","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Conventional wisdom demonstrates that the retailer sharing information voluntarily can prevent encroachment (i.e., information strategy) under the reselling agreement. Considering the prevailing emerging agency selling agreement, we reexamine the effectiveness of the platform’s information strategy when the manufacturer and platform jointly participate in selling format decisions, and further analyze the strategic role of selling format in preventing encroachment. We show that adjusting selling format decision (i.e., sales strategy) can also be an anti-encroachment tool which may be even better than information strategy for the platform. Interestingly, adopting sales strategy and information strategy synthetically (i.e., synthetical strategy) may produce a synergy area to prevent encroachment, outperforming the two strategies used alone. Surprisingly, selling format can also serve as a strategic tool for the manufacturer to promote encroachment. Specifically, if the manufacturer changes from reselling to agency selling, information strategy’s anti-encroachment effectiveness may be eliminated, thus encouraging encroachment. Moreover, switching to agency selling may induce the platform to change information sharing decision, resulting in promoting encroachment.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50541,"journal":{"name":"Electronic Commerce Research and Applications","volume":"67 ","pages":"Article 101435"},"PeriodicalIF":5.9000,"publicationDate":"2024-07-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Promote or prevent manufacturer encroachment? The strategic role of selling format under asymmetric demand information\",\"authors\":\"Lu-Yu Chang ,&nbsp;Chuan-Xu Wang ,&nbsp;Qing Zhang\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.elerap.2024.101435\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><p>Conventional wisdom demonstrates that the retailer sharing information voluntarily can prevent encroachment (i.e., information strategy) under the reselling agreement. Considering the prevailing emerging agency selling agreement, we reexamine the effectiveness of the platform’s information strategy when the manufacturer and platform jointly participate in selling format decisions, and further analyze the strategic role of selling format in preventing encroachment. We show that adjusting selling format decision (i.e., sales strategy) can also be an anti-encroachment tool which may be even better than information strategy for the platform. Interestingly, adopting sales strategy and information strategy synthetically (i.e., synthetical strategy) may produce a synergy area to prevent encroachment, outperforming the two strategies used alone. Surprisingly, selling format can also serve as a strategic tool for the manufacturer to promote encroachment. Specifically, if the manufacturer changes from reselling to agency selling, information strategy’s anti-encroachment effectiveness may be eliminated, thus encouraging encroachment. Moreover, switching to agency selling may induce the platform to change information sharing decision, resulting in promoting encroachment.</p></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":50541,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Electronic Commerce Research and Applications\",\"volume\":\"67 \",\"pages\":\"Article 101435\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":5.9000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-07-14\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Electronic Commerce Research and Applications\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"91\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1567422324000802\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"管理学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"BUSINESS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Electronic Commerce Research and Applications","FirstCategoryId":"91","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1567422324000802","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"BUSINESS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

传统观点认为,零售商自愿分享信息可以防止转售协议下的蚕食(即信息策略)。考虑到目前流行的新兴代理销售协议,我们重新审视了制造商和平台共同参与销售形式决策时平台信息策略的有效性,并进一步分析了销售形式在防止蚕食方面的战略作用。我们发现,调整销售形式决策(即销售策略)也是一种防蚕食工具,对平台而言,其效果可能比信息策略更好。有趣的是,综合采用销售策略和信息策略(即综合策略)可能会产生防止蚕食的协同效应,其效果优于单独采用这两种策略。令人惊讶的是,销售形式也可以作为制造商促进蚕食的战略工具。具体来说,如果制造商将转售改为代理销售,信息战略的防侵占效果可能会消失,从而鼓励侵占。此外,转为代理销售可能会促使平台改变信息共享决策,从而促进蚕食。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Promote or prevent manufacturer encroachment? The strategic role of selling format under asymmetric demand information

Conventional wisdom demonstrates that the retailer sharing information voluntarily can prevent encroachment (i.e., information strategy) under the reselling agreement. Considering the prevailing emerging agency selling agreement, we reexamine the effectiveness of the platform’s information strategy when the manufacturer and platform jointly participate in selling format decisions, and further analyze the strategic role of selling format in preventing encroachment. We show that adjusting selling format decision (i.e., sales strategy) can also be an anti-encroachment tool which may be even better than information strategy for the platform. Interestingly, adopting sales strategy and information strategy synthetically (i.e., synthetical strategy) may produce a synergy area to prevent encroachment, outperforming the two strategies used alone. Surprisingly, selling format can also serve as a strategic tool for the manufacturer to promote encroachment. Specifically, if the manufacturer changes from reselling to agency selling, information strategy’s anti-encroachment effectiveness may be eliminated, thus encouraging encroachment. Moreover, switching to agency selling may induce the platform to change information sharing decision, resulting in promoting encroachment.

求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
Electronic Commerce Research and Applications
Electronic Commerce Research and Applications 工程技术-计算机:跨学科应用
CiteScore
10.10
自引率
8.30%
发文量
97
审稿时长
63 days
期刊介绍: Electronic Commerce Research and Applications aims to create and disseminate enduring knowledge for the fast-changing e-commerce environment. A major dilemma in e-commerce research is how to achieve a balance between the currency and the life span of knowledge. Electronic Commerce Research and Applications will contribute to the establishment of a research community to create the knowledge, technology, theory, and applications for the development of electronic commerce. This is targeted at the intersection of technological potential and business aims.
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信