{"title":"选择你认识的受害者--将交流引入暴徒游戏","authors":"Dmitri Bershadskyy, Alexandra Seidel","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2024.102265","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Mobbing causes severe damages to the victims and is a prime example of antisocial coordination. Using the ‘mobbing game’ by Abbink and Doğan (2019), we investigate the role of communication and incremental incentives on mobbing in a laboratory experiment. Doing so, we vary the degree of strategic vs. social communication on the one hand and the pecuniary incentives of repeatedly bullying a certain victim on the other hand. Results indicate that incremental incentives increase nomination rates (i.e., attempts to mob another player) and mobbing rates (i.e., successful group coordination to reduce payoffs of one player). In contrast, communication decreases nomination rates without having significant effect on mobbing rates. Further, communication analysis indicates our approach to eliminate strategic communication was successful and can be applied in other setups.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6000,"publicationDate":"2024-07-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214804324001022/pdfft?md5=3606530a5e817906474dca777b5a14f3&pid=1-s2.0-S2214804324001022-main.pdf","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Choosing a victim you know\",\"authors\":\"Dmitri Bershadskyy, Alexandra Seidel\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.socec.2024.102265\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><p>Mobbing causes severe damages to the victims and is a prime example of antisocial coordination. Using the ‘mobbing game’ by Abbink and Doğan (2019), we investigate the role of communication and incremental incentives on mobbing in a laboratory experiment. Doing so, we vary the degree of strategic vs. social communication on the one hand and the pecuniary incentives of repeatedly bullying a certain victim on the other hand. Results indicate that incremental incentives increase nomination rates (i.e., attempts to mob another player) and mobbing rates (i.e., successful group coordination to reduce payoffs of one player). In contrast, communication decreases nomination rates without having significant effect on mobbing rates. Further, communication analysis indicates our approach to eliminate strategic communication was successful and can be applied in other setups.</p></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":51637,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.6000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-07-14\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214804324001022/pdfft?md5=3606530a5e817906474dca777b5a14f3&pid=1-s2.0-S2214804324001022-main.pdf\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214804324001022\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214804324001022","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
Mobbing causes severe damages to the victims and is a prime example of antisocial coordination. Using the ‘mobbing game’ by Abbink and Doğan (2019), we investigate the role of communication and incremental incentives on mobbing in a laboratory experiment. Doing so, we vary the degree of strategic vs. social communication on the one hand and the pecuniary incentives of repeatedly bullying a certain victim on the other hand. Results indicate that incremental incentives increase nomination rates (i.e., attempts to mob another player) and mobbing rates (i.e., successful group coordination to reduce payoffs of one player). In contrast, communication decreases nomination rates without having significant effect on mobbing rates. Further, communication analysis indicates our approach to eliminate strategic communication was successful and can be applied in other setups.
期刊介绍：
The Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly the Journal of Socio-Economics) welcomes submissions that deal with various economic topics but also involve issues that are related to other social sciences, especially psychology, or use experimental methods of inquiry. Thus, contributions in behavioral economics, experimental economics, economic psychology, and judgment and decision making are especially welcome. The journal is open to different research methodologies, as long as they are relevant to the topic and employed rigorously. Possible methodologies include, for example, experiments, surveys, empirical work, theoretical models, meta-analyses, case studies, and simulation-based analyses. Literature reviews that integrate findings from many studies are also welcome, but they should synthesize the literature in a useful manner and provide substantial contribution beyond what the reader could get by simply reading the abstracts of the cited papers. In empirical work, it is important that the results are not only statistically significant but also economically significant. A high contribution-to-length ratio is expected from published articles and therefore papers should not be unnecessarily long, and short articles are welcome. Articles should be written in a manner that is intelligible to our generalist readership. Book reviews are generally solicited but occasionally unsolicited reviews will also be published. Contact the Book Review Editor for related inquiries.
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