富有成效的解释:评估心理科学解释的框架。

IF 5.1 1区 心理学 Q1 PSYCHOLOGY
Noah van Dongen, Riet van Bork, Adam Finnemann, Jonas M B Haslbeck, Han L J van der Maas, Donald J Robinaugh, Jill de Ron, Jan Sprenger, Denny Borsboom
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引用次数: 0

摘要

解释心理现象是心理科学的核心目标。然而,解释的本质以及我们评估某一理论是否解释了某一现象的过程往往并不明确。因此,我们往往不知道某一心理学理论是否真的解释了某一现象。针对这一缺陷,我们提出了一种富有成效的解释方法:当且仅当一种理论的形式模型产生了代表现象的统计模式时,该理论才能在一定程度上解释现象。利用这一观点,我们概述了一种可行的解释方法:(a) 将口头理论解释为正式模型,(b) 将现象表示为数据中的统计模式,(c) 评估正式模型是否产生了这些统计模式。此外,我们还提供了评价解释好坏的三个主要标准(精确性、稳健性和经验相关性),并研究了一些解释失效的案例。最后,我们将我们的框架置于现有的科学哲学解释理论之中,并讨论我们的方法如何有助于构建和发展更好的心理学理论。(PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved)。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Productive explanation: A framework for evaluating explanations in psychological science.

The explanation of psychological phenomena is a central aim of psychological science. However, the nature of explanation and the processes by which we evaluate whether a theory explains a phenomenon are often unclear. Consequently, it is often unknown whether a given psychological theory indeed explains a phenomenon. We address this shortcoming by proposing a productive account of explanation: a theory explains a phenomenon to some degree if and only if a formal model of the theory produces the statistical pattern representing the phenomenon. Using this account, we outline a workable methodology of explanation: (a) explicating a verbal theory into a formal model, (b) representing phenomena as statistical patterns in data, and (c) assessing whether the formal model produces these statistical patterns. In addition, we provide three major criteria for evaluating the goodness of an explanation (precision, robustness, and empirical relevance), and examine some cases of explanatory breakdowns. Finally, we situate our framework within existing theories of explanation from philosophy of science and discuss how our approach contributes to constructing and developing better psychological theories. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

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来源期刊
Psychological review
Psychological review 医学-心理学
CiteScore
9.70
自引率
5.60%
发文量
97
期刊介绍: Psychological Review publishes articles that make important theoretical contributions to any area of scientific psychology, including systematic evaluation of alternative theories.
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