{"title":"环境和社会信息披露、管理控制和投资效率","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.jcae.2024.100435","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This study investigates the effect of environmental and social (E&S) disclosure and managerial entrenchment on investment efficiency. E&S disclosure increases not only capital accessibility but also external monitoring of entrenched managers’ actions. We develop a theoretical model that demonstrates how these benefits and costs of firms’ voluntary E&S disclosure affect investment efficiency. Using a large sample of U.S.-listed firms over the period 2016–2022, we test the model’s predictions and provide empirical evidence suggesting that E&S disclosure is positively associated with investment efficiency and that this effect is stronger for firms with lower managerial entrenchment or those disclosing more financially material E&S information. Our study contributes to the investment efficiency literature by demonstrating the relevance of an incentive-compatible mechanism reflecting managers’ choice of E&S voluntary disclosure to the efficient capital allocation.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":46693,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.9000,"publicationDate":"2024-07-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Environmental and social disclosure, managerial entrenchment, and investment efficiency\",\"authors\":\"\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.jcae.2024.100435\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><p>This study investigates the effect of environmental and social (E&S) disclosure and managerial entrenchment on investment efficiency. E&S disclosure increases not only capital accessibility but also external monitoring of entrenched managers’ actions. We develop a theoretical model that demonstrates how these benefits and costs of firms’ voluntary E&S disclosure affect investment efficiency. Using a large sample of U.S.-listed firms over the period 2016–2022, we test the model’s predictions and provide empirical evidence suggesting that E&S disclosure is positively associated with investment efficiency and that this effect is stronger for firms with lower managerial entrenchment or those disclosing more financially material E&S information. Our study contributes to the investment efficiency literature by demonstrating the relevance of an incentive-compatible mechanism reflecting managers’ choice of E&S voluntary disclosure to the efficient capital allocation.</p></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":46693,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":2.9000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-07-05\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1815566924000353\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"管理学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"BUSINESS, FINANCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1815566924000353","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
Environmental and social disclosure, managerial entrenchment, and investment efficiency
This study investigates the effect of environmental and social (E&S) disclosure and managerial entrenchment on investment efficiency. E&S disclosure increases not only capital accessibility but also external monitoring of entrenched managers’ actions. We develop a theoretical model that demonstrates how these benefits and costs of firms’ voluntary E&S disclosure affect investment efficiency. Using a large sample of U.S.-listed firms over the period 2016–2022, we test the model’s predictions and provide empirical evidence suggesting that E&S disclosure is positively associated with investment efficiency and that this effect is stronger for firms with lower managerial entrenchment or those disclosing more financially material E&S information. Our study contributes to the investment efficiency literature by demonstrating the relevance of an incentive-compatible mechanism reflecting managers’ choice of E&S voluntary disclosure to the efficient capital allocation.