环境和社会信息披露、管理控制和投资效率

IF 2.9 3区 管理学 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Hong Kim Duong , Ying Wu , Eduardo Schiehll , Hong Yao
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本研究探讨了环境与社会(E&S)信息披露和管理阶层固化对投资效率的影响。E&S 信息披露不仅提高了资本的可获得性,还增加了外部对固化管理者行为的监督。我们建立了一个理论模型,说明企业自愿披露 E&S 信息的收益和成本如何影响投资效率。我们使用 2016-2022 年期间的大量美国上市公司样本,检验了模型的预测,并提供了经验证据,表明 E&S 信息披露与投资效率正相关,而且这种效应对于管理者固化程度较低的公司或披露更多财务上重要的 E&S 信息的公司更强。我们的研究证明了反映经理人选择自愿披露 E&S 信息的激励兼容机制与有效资本配置的相关性,从而为投资效率文献做出了贡献。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Environmental and social disclosure, managerial entrenchment, and investment efficiency

This study investigates the effect of environmental and social (E&S) disclosure and managerial entrenchment on investment efficiency. E&S disclosure increases not only capital accessibility but also external monitoring of entrenched managers’ actions. We develop a theoretical model that demonstrates how these benefits and costs of firms’ voluntary E&S disclosure affect investment efficiency. Using a large sample of U.S.-listed firms over the period 2016–2022, we test the model’s predictions and provide empirical evidence suggesting that E&S disclosure is positively associated with investment efficiency and that this effect is stronger for firms with lower managerial entrenchment or those disclosing more financially material E&S information. Our study contributes to the investment efficiency literature by demonstrating the relevance of an incentive-compatible mechanism reflecting managers’ choice of E&S voluntary disclosure to the efficient capital allocation.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
6.00
自引率
3.00%
发文量
24
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