Financial incentives to stop smoking: Potential financial consequences of different reward schedules.

Introduction: Financial incentives to stop smoking (FISS) programs have been implemented internationally to encourage people who smoke to quit smoking. However, such programs require that the financial reward structure and its resulting effects on smoking quit rates are considered. We analyzed a number of scenarios for FISS reward schedules for current smoking individuals in Ireland, with a view to identify the potential implications in terms of financial consequences and expected effects.

Methods: Using national QuitManager services data 2021-2023, we defined smoking quit rates for smokers currently using the national Health Services Executive stop smoking services in Ireland. Smoking quit rates at 4, 12 and 52 weeks were defined, and additionally defined by sex, age and education level. Using scenarios assuming different FISS reward sizes, structures and targeted population sub-groups, we estimated the number of additional quitters, budget impact, and incremental cost-effectiveness ratio.

Results: A FISS program, if implemented for a cohort of 3500 smokers can result in a budget impact ranging €250000 - €870000. The cost-effectiveness trade-off between different payment schedules and the expected effect size suggested that FISS are cost-effective even at a moderate effect size. A FISS program implemented to approximately 20000 smokers nationally would cost between €2.0 million and €4.8 million, subject to the chosen reward schedule. Across social groups, FISS is more cost-effective for females, individuals in the youngest age group, and individuals with a medium level of education.

Conclusions: This analysis highlights the importance of considering different FISS schedules and potential quit effects, when designing such programs. We highlight that FISS programs should be targeted at certain social groups to achieve highest long-term smoking cessation rates. We also identified important challenges that decision-makers face when designing the reward structure of FISS programs. The acceptability or otherwise of the FISS structures may differ among stakeholders and should be explored.