对分享虚假新闻的惩罚

IF 2.8 2区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS
Biljana Meiske , Amalia Álvarez-Benjumea , Giulia Andrighetto , Eugenia Polizzi
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引用次数: 0

摘要

针对在社交媒体上分享的错误信息而发布的纠正性评论不仅能有效减少观察者对错误信息的相信,而且还是一种针对假新闻分享的可公开观察到的社会惩罚。我们认为,通过明显地显示惩罚行为,纠正评论有可能起到规范提示的作用,更新观察者对规范惩罚的看法,即所谓的 "元规范"。我们进行了一项预先注册的在线实验,参与者参加了类似于在线论坛的讨论,并可以对之前用户分享的帖子发表评论。我们操纵了参与者观察到对分享假新闻的帖子回复的纠正性评论的可能性,并测量了这种变化对他们留下纠正性评论的倾向的影响。我们的研究表明,即使在控制了参与者对分享帖子准确性的感知后,暴露于其他用户更正的帖子的参与者也更有可能回复更正评论。受试者在看到之前用户提供的更正后,会认为回复更正评论更符合社交习惯。我们的研究结果表明,社会更正可以作为一种(元)规范暗示,通过提高更正的社会适当性来增加惩罚违反规范行为的概率。我们的研究结果表明,针对 "潜在 "执行者的干预措施可以补充现有的专门针对规范违反者的政策。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Nudging punishment against sharing of fake news

Corrective comments posted in response to misinformation shared on social media are not only effective in reducing belief in misinformation among those observing the interaction but also serve as a publicly observable social punishment against fake news sharing. We suggest that, by visibly displaying punishing behavior, corrective comments have the potential to function as a norm nudge, updating observers’ perception of the norms regulating punishment, the so-called “meta-norms”. We conducted a preregistered online experiment in which participants joined discussions resembling an online forum and could comment on posts shared by previous users. We manipulated participants’ possibility to observe corrective comments replying to a post sharing fake news and measured the effect of this variation on their propensity to leave a corrective comment. We show that participants exposed to posts corrected by other users are significantly more likely to reply with a corrective comment, even after controlling for participants’ perceived accuracy of the shared post. Participants exposed to the corrections provided by previous users perceive replying with corrections as more socially appropriate. Our results suggest that social corrections work as a (meta) norm nudge, increasing the probability of punishing norm violations by increasing the social appropriateness of correcting. Our findings suggest that interventions targeting “would-be” enforcers could complement existing policies specifically directed at norm violators.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
4.70
自引率
3.60%
发文量
170
期刊介绍: The European Economic Review (EER) started publishing in 1969 as the first research journal specifically aiming to contribute to the development and application of economics as a science in Europe. As a broad-based professional and international journal, the EER welcomes submissions of applied and theoretical research papers in all fields of economics. The aim of the EER is to contribute to the development of the science of economics and its applications, as well as to improve communication between academic researchers, teachers and policy makers across the European continent and beyond.
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